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PROTECTING NEWLY DISCOVERED
ANTIQUITIES: THINKING OUTSIDE
THE "FEE SIMPLE" BOX
Peter T. Wendel*
Newly discovered antiquities are "mixed goods. " They have a physical
component (the object itsel) and an intangible component (the
archeological and historical information associated with the discovery).
This dual nature justifies government intervention into the market, not to
capture the positive externalities associated with the antiquity, but to
minimize the negative externalities associated with the law of finders.
When the typical finder excavates an antiquity, its historical and
archeological information is severely damaged, if not destroyed. In
response to this problem, source countries have enacted state
ownership/retention statutes. These laws, however, have their own negative
externalities. They create incentives for finders to turn to the black market
to secure financial compensation and to destroy the historical and
archeological information to make it more difficult to catch them. This
raises the issue of which is worse: market failure or government
intervention failure?
Source countries need to create a stronger incentive for finders to report
their finds. In theory, this is easy: Pay the finders more. In practice, this
is difficult because source countries tend to be antiquities-rich but revenue-
poor. A possible solution is a "possessory estate and future interest
approach " to newly discovered antiquities. If the finder reports the find, he
receives a transferable term of years and the source country receives the
future interest. A transferable term of years creates an incentive for the
finder to go public with the find-the finder can profit from his or her
discovery. The source country receives ultimate ownership of all newly
discovered antiquities at minimal cost (Western museums will be the likely
purchasers; they will pay for the cost of creating the incentive). A
possessory estate and future interest approach could help end the current
feud between source countries and Western museums, two entities that
should work together to secure and protect newly discovered antiquities,
not waste resources fighting each other.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., 1979, University of
Chicago; M.A., 1980, St. Louis University; J.D., 1983, University of Chicago. I thank
Professors Eric Schneider, June Carbone, and Patty Gerstenblith for their respective critiques
of earlier drafts. I also thank Eric Overton, Natalie Blyumkina, Ashley Locke, Chris
"Archie" Archibald, and Eric Willis for their invaluable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 2006, the J. Paul Getty Museum announced that it had
reached a tentative agreement (the Getty Agreement) with Italian authorities
to return a number of very significant pieces in its antiquities collection to
Italy.I The Getty Agreement received international recognition.2  It
followed a painful and protracted process in which a former Getty
antiquities curator was charged with conspiring to traffic in illegally
exported antiquities 3 and the ethics of the Getty Trust were called into
1. The agreement reached between the J. Paul Getty Museum and the Italian
government for the return of allegedly looted antiquities (the Getty Agreement) was only
tentative. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Getty Accord with Italy Could Take Months, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 2006, at E8. In November 2006, the talks stalled over which exact objects should
be returned. Hugh Eakin & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Has Regained Many Stolen
Antiquities, but Its Talks with the Getty Stall, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2006, at E3. Director of
the Getty Museum Michael Brand stated that the Getty had made several compromises
during negotiations, but when Italy issued an ultimatum that any agreement must include an
excavated stone statue thought to be Aphrodite and a bronze Statue of a Victorious Youth,
the discussions ended. Press Release, J. Paul Getty Museum, Museum Director Reconfirms
Decision to Return 26 Objects to Italy; Repeats Offer to Continue Discussions Toward a
Comprehensive Collaborative Agreement (Nov. 23, 2006) (on file with author). Thereafter,
negotiations resumed and culminated with an August 1, 2007, announcement that the Getty
had agreed to return a total of forty antiquities (including the twenty-six previously agreed
to) that Italian authorities claimed were illegally exported from the country, including the
Aphrodite. The parties also agreed to put aside discussions on the Statue of a Victorious
Youth until after an Italian court had the opportunity to consider the issue of whether it had
been illegally exported. Elisabetta Povoledo, Getty Agrees to Return 40 Antiquities to Italy,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2007, at El. In addition, the Getty has finalized an agreement with
Greek authorities to return two important antiquities from its collection to Greece. Helena
Smith, Greece Expands Antiquities Pursuit, Art News, Feb. 2007, at 66.
2. See Getty Museum Agrees to Return Some Objects, Int'l Herald Trib., June 22, 2006,
at 6; Tracy Wilkinson et al., Getty Museum to Return to Italy "Very Significant" Antiquities,
Irish Times, June 23, 2006, at 15.
3. Tracy Wilkinson, Ex-Getty Antiquities Curator Appears at Italian Court Session,
L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 2005, at A9. The curator in question was Marion True.
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question over their acquisition practices. 4 The Getty Agreement was hailed
as a watershed development that would constitute a substantial step forward
in the fight to protect newly discovered antiquities 5 by curtailing the
international black market for illegally exported antiquities.6
Unfortunately, newly discovered antiquities will continue to be at risk until
source countries do a better job of creating incentives for finders of such
antiquities to report their finds to the proper authorities.
7
4. See generally Ralph Frammolino & Jason Felch, The Getty's Troubled Goddess,
L.A. Times, Jan. 3, 2007, at Al; Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, The Met, Ending 30-Year
Stance, Is Set to Yield Prized Vase to Italy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2006, at Al. To be fair, the
Getty Museum's acquisitions practices were not the only ones questioned. So too were those
of other prominent American, European, and Asian museums. See Hugh Eakin, Greece and
Italy Team Up to Reclaim Lost Art, Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 11, 2006, at 2.
5. There is no generally agreed upon definition of what constitutes an antiquity. The
U.S. federal government defines an "archaeological resource" as "any material remains of
past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest" and which are at least one
hundred years old. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (1994). Some states have their own definition of
what constitutes an antiquity or archeological artifact, as do many foreign countries. See Ind.
Code Ann. § 14-21-1-2 (LexisNexis 2003); Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-2300 (2006); Antiquities
Law No. 59 of 1936, amended by No. 120 (1974), No. 164 (1975) (Iraq); Law no. 117 of
1983 on the Protection of Antiquities art. 1 (Egypt), quoted in United States v. Schultz, 333
F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2003). An antiquity is a subset of "cultural property" which is
defined by the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property as "property which, on religious or
secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science .... Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat. 2329, 2330-63, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
Convention on Cultural Property], reprinted in The Protection of Movable Cultural Property
357 (1984); see also Robin Hardy Villanueva, Note, Free Trade and the Protection of
Cultural Property: The Need for an Economic Incentive to Report Newly Discovered
Antiquities, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 547, 547 n.1 (1995). Antiquities can be
divided into two categories: (1) newly discovered antiquities that have not been reported to
the state, and (2) previously discovered antiquities that the state knows about but which are
still in the ground and at risk of being stolen. Protection of the latter is primarily a question
of source countries providing adequate resources to deter criminal activity. Protection of the
former, the newly discovered antiquity, is more difficult in that the source countries do not
even know of the antiquity unless and until the finder reports his or her find to the proper
authorities. Most of the antiquities in question in the Getty dispute, including the 2400-year-
old statute of Aphrodite, the best known work in the Getty's antiquities collection, are
alleged to have been newly discovered antiquities that were illegally excavated and exported
for profit. See Frammolino & Felch, supra note 4; Elisabetta Povoledo, Casting Blame for
Looting in Trial of Getty Ex-Curator, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2007, at E3 (referring to forty-six
antiquities).
6. "A deal with the Getty would be the capstone so far in a campaign by Italy to end the
smuggling of its vast trove of antiquities to the world's top museums and private collections,
a clandestine operation spanning generations and continents." Wilkinson et al., supra note 2.
7. While the Getty Agreement may affect the willingness of museums to purchase
antiquities with questionable provenance, it will not affect the willingness of other parties
who deal on the thriving international black market for antiquities, such as individual
collectors, from transacting. In fact, one could argue that the Getty Agreement will only
force more illegally exported antiquities to be sold to less scrupulous parties on the
international black market, which will decrease the likelihood that the source countries, and
the public in general, will ever see the antiquity again.
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Whether agreements like the Getty Agreement will improve protection of
newly discovered antiquities begs the question of whether they should be
protected. Source countries maintain that newly discovered antiquities are
unique and should be protected. 8 Source countries typically protect newly
discovered antiquities by claiming ownership over them and/or restricting
their transfer. 9 But neoclassical economics maintains that utility and social
welfare are maximized when goods are freely transferable.' 0 Assuming,
arguendo, that newly discovered antiquities should be protected, there is
ample evidence suggesting the source countries' current approach to
protecting newly discovered antiquities is ineffective. A thriving black
market for antiquities exists which undermines source countries' efforts at
securing ownership/retention." The value of a newly discovered antiquity,
coupled with the minimal compensation-if any-offered by source
countries for it, create an incentive for finders to turn to the black market
that many cannot resist.
The solution appears simple: Reward finders of newly discovered
antiquities who report their find.' 2 The traditional method of rewarding
finders is to grant them title. 13 Finders of antiquities, however, typically
sell them to museums in consuming countries, 14 which conflicts with source
countries' efforts at retaining possession of all archeological artifacts. 15 In
the alternative, source countries could reward finders by purchasing the
newly discovered antiquity. But source countries tend to be antiquities-rich
but revenue-poor.' 6 Requiring source countries to pay market prices, or
even close to market prices, for all newly discovered antiquities is not
financially feasible. But failure to pay reasonable compensation is what
drives the black market for antiquities, which in turn undermines source
countries' efforts at retaining possession of all newly discovered
antiquities. 17
Moreover, antiquities are dualistic. They have the obvious tangible
artistic component, but they have an equally important, if not more
important, "intangible" archeological, historical, and cultural component.' 8
This information, which is very valuable and fragile, is maximized when
the finder leaves the newly discovered antiquity in the ground and permits
archeologists to excavate it.'9 Theoretically, awarding all property rights in
newly discovered antiquities to the source country protects this information
8. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part L.B.
13. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 63-68, 206-08 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 127-28, 136 and accompanying text.
2007] 1019
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
because finders have no incentive to touch the antiquity-they have no right
to it.20 In practice, however, rational, self-interested finders typically refuse
to recognize the state's claim of ownership/retention. 21 The prevailing
source country approach then becomes counterproductive. Finders have an
incentive to destroy the archeological, historical, and cultural information
associated with the newly discovered antiquity to obfuscate its provenance,
thereby minimizing the chances that the government can prove the antiquity
was illegally excavated and transferred. 22
The goal is to devise a legal system which protects both the tangible and
intangible components of a newly discovered antiquity. If the legal system
is to provide meaningful protection, it needs to create an incentive for
finders of newly discovered antiquities to come forward and report their
find to the proper authorities. 23 The dilemma is how to create such an
incentive without requiring source countries to sacrifice either (1) their goal
of retaining ownership and control of all newly discovered antiquities, or
(2) their financial stability.
The prevailing analysis of the source countries' dilemma has floundered
because it assumes an all-or-nothing approach to allocating property rights
to newly discovered antiquities: It assumes that all property rights must be
assigned either to the finder or to the source country. 24 If, however, one
thinks outside the fee simple box and applies a "possessory estate and
future interest approach," a viable solution emerges. The finder could be
awarded a transferable term of years, 25 with the source country retaining the
future interest. 26 Awarding finders a transferable term of years would
create a strong financial incentive for finders to report their finds, but not at
the expense of the source countries. The purchaser of the term of years
would pay for the incentive. 27 The purchasers typically will be consuming
country museums, which are in the best position to distribute the cost. 28 In
return, the museums get good, albeit limited, title to the newly discovered
antiquity, which includes the right to study and show the antiquity. 29
Granting the future interest to the source country satisfies the country's
interest in retaining ultimate ownership and control over the antiquity.
A possessory estate and future interest approach would constitute a
substantial step forward in the fight to protect newly discovered antiquities.
It would help curtail the international black market for antiquities by
20. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text. The term of years could be
conditioned upon the finder reporting the find to the source country in a timely manner. See
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 253-58.
28. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part IV.H.
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creating a financially more attractive alternative for finders of newly
discovered antiquities. It would also facilitate protection of the newly
discovered antiquity's archeological, historical, and cultural information. A
longer term of years could be awarded to a finder who reports, but leaves
undisturbed, a newly discovered antiquity. 30 The longer term of years
would be more valuable, thereby creating a financial incentive for finders to
preserve the antiquity's intangible component. 31 Archeologists could then
gather the archeological, historical, and cultural information associated with
the find and ensure that the antiquity is removed with minimal damage.32
A possessory estate and future interest approach to allocating property
rights to newly discovered antiquities is a "win-win" approach for all
interested parties. It would maximize protection of newly discovered
antiquities at minimal cost to source countries.
I. SHOULD NEWLY DISCOVERED ANTIQUITIES BE "PROTECTED" OR
FREELY TRANSFERABLE?
A. Economic Introduction
Economics is the study of how society allocates its scarce goods. 33
Individuals seek to maximize the utility they receive from their limited
goods,34 and societies seek to maximize the social welfare they receive
from their scarce resources. 35 Economics assumes that utility and social
welfare are maximized when goods are freely transferable. 36  The
assumption is that market transactions will result in goods being allocated
to their highest and most valuable use, thereby maximizing utility and
social welfare. 37 From an economic perspective, the source countries'
30. See infra Part IV.C-D.
31. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part IV.C-D.
33. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Principles of Law and Economics 1
(2005); N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 4 (3d ed. 2004).
34. See Mark Seidenfeld, Microeconomic Predicates to Law and Economics 6 (1996).
35. Because utility is subjective and cannot be quantified, technically it is inappropriate
to speak of maximizing social utility. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 3; Seidenfeld,
supra note 34, at 6 (discussing how utility is relative, not absolute, and therefore can only be
compared for one individual, not for more than one); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game,
84 N.C. L. Rev. 333, 375 n.173 (2006); Gregory Mitchell, Book Review, Libertarian
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1245, 1267 (2005). Instead, economists
tend to speak of maximizing social welfare or efficiency. See Cole & Grossman, supra note
33, at 9-10; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 5; Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive
and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract Law, II Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 125, 140-41
(2004). But Professor Eric Posner, one of the gurus of the law and economics movement,
maintains that society's goal is to maximize social wealth, not utility or welfare. See Richard
A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 391 (1990). The differences between social
utility, efficiency, social wealth, and social welfare, and the debate over which is the
appropriate social goal, are beyond the scope of this Article, but the concepts are similar.
36. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 10-13; David D. Friedman, Law's Order
20-21 (2000); Mankiw, supra note 33, at 4-5, 8-9.
37. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 10-13; Friedman, supra note 36, at 20-21.
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approach of "protecting" newly discovered antiquities is counterproductive
because it prevents their transfers, which prevents maximizing utility and
social welfare.
B. Traditional Approach: The Law of Finders
Historically, source countries did not protect newly discovered
antiquities; they were treated like any other found property. 38 The socially
desirable goal for found property is to return it to its original owner, if
possible. 39 The first step in the process of returning found property to its
rightful owner is for the finder to go public with the find.40
1. Found Property and the Incentive to Go Public
From a law and economics perspective, a finder has no incentive to go
public with found property.41 The finder currently possesses the item, and
while possession is not title, possession carries with it many benefits. 42
Going public with found property only increases the probability that the
true owner will learn of the find and reclaim the item, leaving the finder
38. See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities:
Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 Chi. J. Int'l L. 169, 174 (2007) (defending the
need for state ownership statutes as necessary to deny finders and subsequent purchasers any
interest in found antiquities); M. June Harris, Who Owns the Pot of Gold at the End of the
Rainbow? A Review of the Impact of Cultural Property on Finders and Salvage Laws, 14
Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 223, 225-30 (1997).
39. Leeanna Izuel, Property Owners' Constructive Possession of Treasure Trove:
Rethinking the Finders Keepers Rule, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1671 (1991); see also Patty
Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 559, 587 (1995). Otherwise, the objective is to get the item
back into circulation and productive use by awarding it either to the finder or the owner of
the locus in quo where it was found. Whether the finder or the owner of the locus in quo
where the item was found have the stronger claim to the item in the event the true owner
does not reclaim the item depends on two variables: how the item is classified legally (lost,
mislaid, abandoned, or treasure trove/embedded) and where the item was found (public
versus private location). See generally Comment, Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned Property, 8
Fordham L. Rev. 222, 224-28 (1939). While mislaid property is generally awarded to the
owner of the locus in quo where it is found, lost, abandoned, and treasure trove/embedded
property is generally awarded to the finder as long as he or she was not trespassing when he
or she found the property; and if he or she was trespassing, the found property is usually
awarded to the owner of the locus in quo. Id. at 226, 234, 236. See generally R.H.
Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 313 (1983).
40. See Harris, supra note 38, at 228; Izuel, supra note 39, at 1671.
41. See Helmholz, supra note 39, at 314 ("[D]epriving the finder of any share of...
property ... indirectly encourages him to [keep secret] what he has found.").
42. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 653, 673 (2003) (discussing one benefit of lawful possession as
the right to defend the property from attack); Ana Sljivic, Why Do You Think It's Yours? An
Exposition of the Jurisprudence Underlying the Debate Between Cultural Nationalism and
Cultural Internationalism, 31 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 393, 404 (1998) (discussing
economic benefits of possessing an antiquity, including tourism and political power); David
N. Chang, Comment, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art Trafficking, 28
Hous. J. Int'l L. 829, 848-50 (2006) (discussing the economic benefits of possession).
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with nothing. Thus, while this is the socially desirable goal, 43 it is not
necessarily the finder's goal.
The law of finders counters this economic risk by offering offsetting
benefits to the finder who comes forward.44 If the finder goes public with
the find, and the true owner does not claim the item within a reasonable
period of time, typically the finder is awarded title to the found property. 45
On the other hand, if a finder does not come forward with his or her find, he
or she does not gain title to the item, 46 and he or she may be subject to civil
and/or criminal penalties. 47 The combined "carrot and stick" approach to
the law of finders does a reasonably good job of creating incentives for a
finder to go public with his or her find.48
2. The Incentive to Go Public and Newly Discovered Antiquities
As applied to newly discovered antiquities, the law of finders does an
even better job of creating an incentive for the finder of an antiquity to go
public than it does with your typical found item. Under the traditional law
of finders, the finder of a newly discovered antiquity quickly performs a
cost-benefit analysis and realizes the risk associated with coming forward
with the antiquity is negligible. Most antiquities are hundreds, if not
thousands, of years old.49 The chance that anyone would be able to claim
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. See David Riesman, Jr., Possession and the Law of Finders, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
1108-09, 1132 (1939) ("If the finder has publicized his find, he gets title by affirmative
prescription after the passage of a stated time.").
45. This idea is implemented through statute in most states. If a true owner fails to
claim property within a certain time of the finder publishing notice, title in the property
irrevocably vests in the finder. See id. at 1109; see also Iowa Code § 556F. 11 (West 2001).
46. See Riesman, Jr., supra note 44, at 1132. How much added value title gives the
finder over mere possession, however, is debatable. First, there is the maxim that possession
is nine-tenths of the law. The finder has superior rights over everyone in the world except
the true owner. See Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). In addition, the
typical "found" item is one which does not have a written record of ownership. So the added
benefit of title arguably is not that great-it typically is not what motivates the finder to
come forward.
47. Where a finder intentionally does not make reasonable efforts to find the true owner,
the finder can be held civilly liable for conversion if not criminally liable for theft. See Ray
Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 3.5 (3d ed. 1975); Norman Palmer, Adrift
on a Sea of Troubles: Cross-Border Art Loans and the Specter of Ulterior Title, 38 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 947, 958 (2005).
48. An added benefit of the traditional law of finders is that the incentive for the finder
to go public with the find is created at minimal administrative cost. For a discussion of the
administrative costs associated with the approach, see infra notes 181-90 and accompanying
text.
49. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention requires that the antiquity be at least one hundred years old. See Convention on
Cultural Property, supra note 5, art. 1; Mark J. Petr, Note, Trading Places: Illicit
Antiquities, Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws, and the U.S. National Stolen Property Act
After United States v. Shultz, 28 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 503, 514 (2005). But some
source country laws base the classification of a protected antiquity on factors other than age.
See Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal
Alternative, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 380-81 (1995) ("Although the majority of national
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ownership of the item is almost zero. For all practical purposes, under the
traditional law of finders, possession of a newly discovered antiquity equals
title. 50
Moreover, going public with the find gives the finder free publicity,
thereby establishing some record of the antiquity's provenance and helping
to create a market for the antiquity. 51 An antiquity's provenance constitutes
added value.5 2 Where it was found and how it was found contribute to the
archeological and historical value of the antiquity.53 In addition, the better
the condition of the antiquity, the more money it commands on the
market. 54  The traditional "finders" approach to newly discovered
antiquities creates a strong incentive for a finder of a newly discovered
antiquity to go public with the find, and as part of that process, providing at
least some information concerning the antiquity's provenance.
This traditional law of finders approach to newly discovered antiquities is
consistent with neoclassical economic principles. Typically the finder was
cultural property laws define protected categories of objects by age, some countries protect
classes of artifacts that are unique to their national histories."); see also Glenna J. Shevland,
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Cultural Resource Laws in Criminal Prosecution for Theft
of Archaeological and Cultural Resources from Federal Lands, 28 New Eng. J. on Crim. &
Civ. Confinement 27, 45-46 (2002) ("NAGPRA does not require that items ... are greater
than a specified age .... ").
50. Harris, supra note 38, at 228 ("Should the treasure trove appear ancient and look as
if someone concealed it, then courts generally award the treasure to the finder."); see also
Helmholz, supra note 39, at 314 ("If the property is genuinely lost,... it has been thought
preferable to allow the finder to prevail in this situation .... (citing Foulke v. N.Y. Consol.
R. Co., 127 N.E. 237 (N.Y. 1920))). See generally Riesman, Jr., supra note 44 (explaining
the law of finders).
51. See Lindsay E. Willis, Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislation Scheme for
the Protection of Iraq's Cultural Heritage, 34 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 221, 242 (2005)
(describing Iraq law granting the first right of publicity to the finder subject to detailed
accounts of the excavation and any publications about the antiquity); Jason C. Roberts,
Comment, The Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico
and the United States, 4 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 327, 358-59 (1997) (discussing the traits
that would create a market to which sellers and buyers of antiquities would be attracted).
52. See Jessica L. Darraby, To Have & To Hold, Cal. Law., May 2006, at 22, 25; see
also Borodkin, supra note 49, at 410-11 (noting that the development of the illicit market
has created an incentive for sellers "to strip as much information as possible from an
artifact" before putting it on the market); Jonathan S. Moore, Note, Enforcing Foreign
Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 Yale L.J. 466, 466 (1988) (explaining that
when antiquities are "removed from a site without first being studied by anthropologists, the
historical record that can be constructed through scientific evaluation ... is destroyed").
53. See Darraby, supra note 52, at 25; see also Sue Choi, Note, The Legal Landscape of
the International Art Market After Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
167, 192-93 (2005) (discussing the value information adds to a market of antiquities);
Moore, supra note 52, at 466. See generally Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the
Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 Conn. J. Int'l L. 197 (2001).
54. Borodkin, supra note 49, at 383 (commenting on how the current state ownership
regime encourages the defacement of antiquities to make them less recognizable and easier
to smuggle); see also Inbal Baum, The Great Mall of China: Should the United States
Restrict Importation of Chinese Cultural Property?, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 919, 937
(2006) (implying importance in location of antiquities as the Chinese government spent
fifteen million yuan to protect antiquity sites, specifically including the "layout" and
"features" of the sites); Choi, supra note 53, at 192-93.
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awarded sole and exclusive ownership of the newly discovered antiquity,
including the right to transfer it.55 As long as finders of newly discovered
antiquities are free to transfer their finds, the subsequent market
transactions would appear to maximize utility and social welfare by
ensuring that the antiquities are transferred to those who value them the
most.
56
C. Advent of Cultural Property: Cultural Nationalism
Versus Cultural Internationalism
During the twentieth century, however, source countries began to
reconsider the wisdom of the law of finders approach to newly discovered
antiquities. This philosophical change coincided with the advent of
"cultural property." 57 Although the cultural property movement can trace
its heritage back to the first-century Greek historian Polybius, 58 it did not
take root until the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries. 59
Cultural property encompasses property that has become so associated with
a people that it is deemed to represent and/or reflect the history,
architecture, culture, and/or values of the people. 60  While authorities
55. Gov't of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 813 (C.D. Cal. 1989); John Alan Cohan,
An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting
Cultural Property (Part One), 27 Environs Envt'l L. & Pol'y J. 1, 7 (2004); Gerstenblith,
supra note 53, at 229-30; Harris, supra note 38, at 227. The finder typically is awarded title
unless he or she was trespassing, and even then the finder is awarded title unless the
landowner can prove that the finder was trespassing at the time of the find. See Paul M.
Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 275, 286 (1982)
(acknowledging this point as applied to newly discovered antiquities which technically have
been claimed by the state). For the more general principle that title to an object typically
includes the bundle of rights to it, including the right to transfer, see Shackleford v. United
States, 262 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The right to transfer is one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property[.]"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the
Virtual Worlds, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 (2004).
56. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 160 (3d ed. 2000); John
Henry Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 1, 10 (1998).
57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also infra note 60 and accompanying
text.
58. Christine Knox, They've Lost Their Marbles: 2002 Universal Museums'
Declaration, the Elgin Marbles and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29 Suffolk
Transnat'l L. Rev. 315, 318 n.13 (2006); John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking
About Cultural Property, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 831, 833 n.7 (1986); John Moustakas, Group
Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1179, 1179
(1989).
59. See Corrine Brenner, Cultural Property Law: Reflecting on the Bamiyan Buddhas'
Destruction, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L: Rev. 237, 239-40 (2006) (citing Andrea Cunning, The
Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War & Peace, II Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L.
211, 214 (2003)); Sasha P. Paroff, Another Victim of the War in Iraq: The Looting of the
National Museum in Baghdad and the Inadequacies of International Protection of Cultural
Property, 53 Emory L.J. 2021, 2028-29 (2004).
60. See Cohan, supra note 55, at 356, 381-82; Gerstenblith, supra note 39, at 569-70;
John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 339, 341
2007] 1025
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
disagree as to what constitutes the scope of cultural property,6 1 there is
widespread agreement that it includes antiquities. 62 The issue is whether
designating antiquities to be cultural property affects what the socially
desirable goal is with respect to newly discovered antiquities. In particular,
should newly discovered antiquities be freely transferable or should they be
owned/retained by the source country?
Cultural property advocates argue that because cultural property is so
intimately connected to the history, architecture, culture, and/or values of
the people, "the people" should have greater rights to cultural property. 63
Such rights range from complete state ownership to greater regulation of the
private owner's right to possess and/or transfer the antiquity. 64 Any such
communal property rights inherently conflict with traditional property
rights based on the neoclassical economic assumption that individual
ownership and control of property is best.6 5
(1989); Merryman, supra note 58, at 831-33 (giving overview of how cultural heritage is
reflected in cultural property).
61: See Michael L. Dutra, Sir, How Much Is That Ming Vase in the Window?:
Protecting Cultural Relics in the People's Republic of China, 5 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J. 62,
65 (2004); Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A New Approach
to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 Duke L.J. 1061, 1074 (2005).
62. See John Henry Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 477, 477 n.I (1988); Sean R. Nicholson, Mutiny as to the Bounty: International Law's
Failing Preservation Efforts Regarding Shipwrecks and Their Artifacts Located in
International Waters, 66 U. Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 135, 155 (1997); Alia Szopa, Hoarding
History: A Survey of Antiquity Looting and Black Market Trade, 13 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev.
55, 58-59 (2004); Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of
Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 Yale J. Int'l L. 183, 188 (2003).
63. See Cohan, supra note 55, at 380-93; Gerstenblith, supra note 39, at 569-72. See
generally Moustakas, supra note 58.
64. See Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 211-13; Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in
the Flourishing International Trade of Art and Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and
Possessio animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, 14 Dick. J. Int'l L. 31, 37-39 (1995) (discussing
examples of complete state ownership); Merryman, supra note 62; Moustakas, supra note
58, at 1202-21 (arguing for strict and absolute inalienability from the group); M. Catherine
Vernon, Note, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective
Intervention, 26 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 435, 462-63 (1994) (arguing that just as states
should have the right to take cultural property from an individual who is not adequately
caring for it, there should also be an international right of intervention which supersedes a
country's rights). See generally Cynthia Ericson, Recent Development, United States of
America v. Frederick Schultz: The National Stolen Property Act Revives the Curse of the
Pharaohs, 12 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 509, 518-19 (2004) (discussing Egyptian Patrimony
Law 117, which asserts state ownership of all antiquities found from 1983 onwards and, for
antiquities properly acquired prior to 1983, requiring that owners of said antiquities must
secure permission from the Egyptian government before they may "transfer, dispose of, or
relocate" said antiquities (quoting United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir.
2003))).
65. See Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology
and the False Promise of the Free Market, 13 Law & Ineq. 303, 352 n.261 (1995)
("Traditional capitalist theory (and hence western economic development theory) holds that
private property is the basis for material well-being and political freedoms. For the best and
most famous articulation of this argument, see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
(1962)."); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J.
283, 290 (1996). The classic "tragedy of the commons" economic principle is about the
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As applied to newly discovered antiquities, this tension is reflected in the
cultural nationalism versus cultural internationalism debate. 66 Cultural
nationalism asserts that cultural property is the heritage of the country of
origin. 67 As such, it belongs to the country of origin. It should not be
transferred out of the country of origin, and if not currently in the country of
origin, it should be returned to the country of origin.68  Cultural
internationalism, on the other hand, asserts that cultural property is the
cultural heritage of all mankind.69 As such it belongs to no particular
country and should be freely transferable (particularly if it helps to preserve
and protect the property) to promote accessibility and research. 70 Scholars
disagree over which approach should apply to antiquities. 71
inefficiencies of public ownership versus the efficiencies of private ownership. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
66. For an explanation of ideologies and discourses regarding the international
movement of cultural property, see Merryman, supra note 56, at 9-13.
67. See Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen
Property Act and the Abiding Trade in Looted Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1031,
1060 (2006); see also Knox, supra note 58, at 322-24; Merryman, supra note 58, at 832,
842-45.
68. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 1060; see also Knox, supra note 58, at 322-24;
Merryman, supra note 58, at 832, 842-45.
69. Goldberg, supra note 67, at 1061-62; see also Knox, supra note 58, at 319-22;
Merryman, supra note 58, at 845-49. At the theoretical and academic level, some
authorities have tried to mitigate the cultural property movement by arguing that to the
extent cultural property rights exist because the property is deemed to have such an
important connection to the culture of the people, the issue becomes who constitutes "the
people." Early notions of cultural property assumed that "the people" were defined on a
national or subnational level. More recently, however, scholars have argued that as the
world gets "smaller," the role of countries and notions of national cultural property become
increasingly outdated. See Merryman, supra note 58, at 831-32, 852-53. Under this
approach, most, if not all, cultural property belongs to everyone. Inasmuch as universal
ownership is not practical, who happens to own and possess the property is merely
incidental-there is no special case for state ownership of cultural property or national
retention of cultural property. The overriding consideration should be who is in the best
position to preserve the property. See Laura M. Siegle, United States v. Schultz: Putting
Cultural Property in its Place, 18 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 453, 454 (2004); Karen
Goepfert, Note, The Decapitation of Rameses II, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 503, 507-08 (1995). Not
surprisingly, the directors of many of the most prominent museums around the world
recently endorsed the notion of global cultural property. See John Alan Cohan, An
Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural
Property (Part Two), 28 Environs Envt'l L. & Pol'y J. 1, 93-94 (2004); Knox, supra note
58, at 325-26.
70. See Knox, supra note 58, at 321 (2006); Merryman, supra note 58, at 846; Goepfert,
supra note 69, at 514.
71. Knox, supra note 58, at 319-22 (addressing the flaws in both theories); Merryman,
supra note 58, at 831-32, 845-49 (advocating for cultural internationalism); Goldberg, supra
note 67, at 1061-63 (discussing cultural nationalism, cultural internationalism, and
contextualism).
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D. Economic Analysis of Cultural Nationalism
Versus Cultural Internationalism
Implicit in the debate between cultural nationalism and cultural
internationalism is the issue of which approach maximizes utility and social
welfare. 72  Cultural nationalism, with its state ownership/retention
policies,73 appears inherently inconsistent with maximizing utility and
social welfare to the extent it prevents market transactions. 74 Neoclassical
economics espouses that voluntary market transactions are the means by
which utility and social welfare are maximized. 75 Only if antiquities are
freely transferable can utility and social welfare be maximized.
1. Assumption of Perfectly Competitive Market Conditions
The economic principle that voluntary market transactions maximize
utility and social welfare, however, assumes perfectly competitive market
conditions. 76 Perfectly competitive market conditions include, among other
factors, that the good in question is a private good,77 as opposed to a public
good, which generates no externalities 78 (all costs and benefits are captured
72. Phrased this way, implicit in the debate is also the question of who constitutes "the
society": Should it be defined at the local or national level, or should it be defined at the
international level? See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
73. See Merryman, supra note 62, at 477-78 (breaking the different state
ownership/retention approaches into three categories: expropriation laws (state ownership
law), embargo laws (transfer/export restriction laws), and preemption laws (right to purchase
laws)). This Article will refer to these approaches collectively as the "state
ownership/retention approach."
74. Rather, utility and social welfare would be maximized by putting the item back into
circulation. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
75. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text.
76. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 13-18; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 154; Eyal
Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 1710, 1780 n.244 (1997).
77. See Kristen H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and
Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 311 (1997); Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest
Form of Flattery? Application of the Fair Use Defense Against Copyright Claims for
Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation Documents, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 391, 418 (2006); Jon
Polenberg, Comment, tfosorciM and croMiftos: Why High-Technology Antitrust Inquiry Is
Backwards and Inside-Out, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 1275, 1278 n.10 (2003).
78. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 14-15; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 154;
Robert A. Katz, The Re-gift of Life: Can Charity Law Prevent For-Profit Firms from
Exploiting Donated Tissue and Nonprofit Tissue Banks?, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 943, 975 n.217
(2006) (citing Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 13). Externalities are consequences from
an action which are not borne by the party who undertook an action. Cole & Grossman,
supra note 33, at 14; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L.
Rev. 257, 257 (2007). Internalizing externalities, or the costs and benefits to others that
result from a private actor's actions, ensures social welfare is maximized because in the
perfectly competitive market it will lead to the survival of those actors who are best able to
lower the total costs both to society and to the private actor. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1556 (1999).
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within the market). 79 A private good has two characteristics: It is both
excludable and rivalrous. 80 Excludable means it is easy to exclude others
from using/enjoying the good.81  Rivalrous means one person's use
prevents/seriously interferes with the ability of others to use the good.82
Conversely, a public good is nonexclusive and non-rivalrous. 83  It is
difficult to exclude others from using the good,84 and one person's use does
not prevent/seriously interfere with the ability of others to use the good.85
2. Private Goods Versus Public Goods
There are classic examples of private and public goods. A classic private
good is an ice cream cone. 86 An ice cream cone is excludable because it is
easy to exclude others from using that particular ice cream cone. 87 An ice
79. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 Ecology L.Q. 183, 200 (2005); Keith N.
Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977, 989 (1996); Alan J.
Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect
Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, I J. Competition L. & Econ. 21, 86 n.343 (2005) (noting
that perfect competition requires that there are no externalities, i.e., that "producers pay all
social costs incurred in the production of goods and services and receive payment for all
social benefits incurred.").
80. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43,
106-07; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25; Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the
Organization of Information Production, 22 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 81, 101 n.13 (2002).
81. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43,
106-07; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25; William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of
Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent
Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 933.
82. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43,
106-07; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25; Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing:
When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim Compensation, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 547, 554 n.38
(2003).
83. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43,
106-07; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25; Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal. L.
Rev. 1655, 1700 n.260 (2006).
84. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25;
O'Connell, supra note 83, at 1700 n.260.
85. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43,
106-07; Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25. While pure public goods are characterized by
complete non-excludability and non-rivalry or non-diminishability, few goods satisfy this
standard. Practically, most examples of public goods are somewhere along a continuum of
excludability and diminishability. See Gary H. Jefferson, China's State Enterprises: Public
Goods, Externalities, and Coase, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 428 (1998); see also Roger Van den
Bergh & Yves Montangie, Competition in Professional Services Markets: Are Latin
Notaries Different?, 2 J. Competition L. & Econ. 189, 192 (2006). In fact, many goods are
"mixed goods." See Joseph Blocher, Note, Private Business as Public Good: Hotel
Development and Kelo, 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 363, 371-72 (2006). In contrast, a purely
private good is one where one party's use and enjoyment inherently and completely
precludes another's use and enjoyment. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 106.
86. See Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25; C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of
Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1357, 1379 (2000); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Social Services and the Market, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1405, 1413 (1983).
87. See Mankiw, supra note 33, at 224-25.
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cream cone is rivalrous because one person's consumption prevents others
from being able to consume that particular cone.88  Moreover, one's
consumption of the ice cream cone does not generate any externalities-
positive or negative. As long as there is more ice cream and there are more
cones, one person's consumption of one ice cream cone has no effect on
others. On the other hand, a classic example of a public good is a
lighthouse. 89 A lighthouse is non-excludable because it is difficult to
exclude others from using and enjoying the light from the lighthouse. 90 In
addition, a lighthouse is non-rivalrous because one party's use and
enjoyment of the light from the lighthouse does not interfere with others'
ability to use and enjoy the light.91 Moreover, the light from a lighthouse
generates substantial positive externalities. 92 Building a lighthouse for one
boat produces light which can be used and enjoyed by many other boats,
without cost, to avoid the coastline (a positive externality). The greater the
positive externalities, the greater the likelihood the good is a public good.93
From an economic perspective, the terms "private good" and "public
good" are not so much different categories as they are two ends of a
spectrum. 94 Many goods fall somewhere in between the classic private
good and the classic public good. A good which has characteristics of both
a private good and a public good is a "mixed" good. 95
3. A Newly Discovered Antiquity Constitutes a Mixed Good
A newly discovered antiquity is a mixed good. A newly discovered
antiquity has both tangible and intangible components. The tangible
component is self-evident: It is the object itself. The intangible component
is the architectural, historical, and cultural value associated with the newly
discovered antiquity. The architectural, historical, and/or cultural
characteristics are the unique aspects of the item and are what qualify it as
88. See id.
89. Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of
Copyrighted Works, 81 Ind. L.J. 851, 870 (2006); Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of
the Arms Race, 81 Ind. L.J. 917, 920 n. 10 (2006).
90. Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 15 (defining positive externalities). Positive externalities are spillover
benefits which are produced by the conduct or transaction in question which the party
undertaking the action or conduct cannot capture and hence are freely distributed to third
parties. For a discussion of externalities generally, see supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
93. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 16; Van den Bergh & Montangie, supra
note 85, at 192; Blocher, supra note 85, at 371.
94. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 545, 554-
55 (2004); see also Per-Olof Bjuggren & Henrik af Donner, Ownership of a Cultural
Landmark: The Case of Gotha Canal, 21 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 499, 505 (2002).
95. See Gerstenblith, supra note 39, at 567-68 ("The term 'culture' describes the
relationship between a group and the objects it holds important. The concept of 'property' in
its traditional sense" focuses on the legal rights of private individuals).
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an antiquity. 96 The tangible component of an antiquity is similar to the
classic private good. For example, assume the antiquity is a vase or similar
item of personal property. It is excludable because it is easy to exclude
others from using that particular vase. 97 It is rivalrous because one person's
possession prevents others from being able to possess that particular vase at
the same time.98 The intangible component of the antiquity, however,
resembles the classic public good. The intangible characteristics are non-
rivalrous because use and enjoyment of the architectural, historical, and/or
cultural features of the antiquity by one does not necessarily interfere with
the simultaneous use and enjoyment of these attributes by others. 99 The
intangible component of an antiquity is also non-excludable. It is difficult
to exclude others from using and enjoying the architectural, historical,
and/or cultural features of the antiquity at the same time. 
100
4. Newly Discovered Antiquities and Positive Externalities
The non-excludability and non-rivalrous nature of an antiquity's
intangible qualities are evidence of the antiquity's substantial positive
externalities. Positive externalities arise when a good/transaction creates
benefits for the community that the owner/parties to the transaction cannot
internalize. 0 1 The very nature of an antiquity is that it has special value for
a whole community, if not a whole country. 10 2 An antiquity reflects, and
represents, the architecture, history, culture, and/or values of the people. 10 3
Once knowledge of the newly discovered antiquity has been disseminated,
the community/country as a whole receives an intangible cultural benefit
96. As one scholar noted, "Antiquities have been around a long time." Merryman, supra
note 60, at 345 (quoting Jody Maxmin). Simply being around a "long time," however, is not
what makes an item an antiquity. An antiquity has certain characteristics; it reflects the
history, architecture, culture, and/or values of the people who created it. See supra note 60
and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the exclusivity component of a private good, see supra notes 80-
81, 86-87 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the ivalrous component of a private good, see supra notes 80,
82, 86, 88 and accompanying text.
99. For a general discussion of the non-rivalrous nature of a public good, see supra notes
83, 85, 91 and accompanying text.
100. For a general discussion of the nonexclusive nature of a public good, see supra notes
83, 84, 90 and accompanying text. This statement, however, is admittedly overly broad.
Where the antiquity is an object of personal property, personal enjoyment of the antiquity
can be exclusive by hiding the antiquity. Once knowledge of the antiquity and its
metaphysical components is public information, however, like any other information, that
aspect of the antiquity is a public good that is nonexclusive.
101. See Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 8 (2006);
Joseph Blocher, supra note 85, at 370; Jeffrey M. Jakubiak, Note, Maintaining Air Safety at
Less Cost: A Plan for Replacing FAA Safety Regulations with Strict Liability, 6 Cornell J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 421, 439 n.129 (1997).
102. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
103. See id.
10312007]
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
that is shared and enjoyed by all. 10 4 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
exclude the community or country from this benefit. The greater the
positive externalities associated with a good, the stronger the argument that
it should be classified as a public good. 105 The intangible architectural,
historical, and/or cultural characteristics of an item are primarily what
qualify it as cultural property. 10 6 It is these exact qualities which generate
the positive externalities and define the newly discovered antiquity as a
public good. To the extent an antiquity is a mixed good, it is much closer to
the public good end of the spectrum.
5. Public Goods and Market Failure
The economic significance of an antiquity's positive externalities and its
public good characteristics is that these are commonly recognized sources
of "market failure"-where the assumption that market transactions will
maximize social welfare does not apply. 10 7 A classic example of market
104. See id.
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 5 for a discussion of what constitutes an antiquity.
107. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 56, at 40-43; John C. Yoo, Force Rules: UN Reform
and Intervention, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 641, 655 (2006); Mollie Lee, Note, Environmental
Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 Yale L.J. 456, 479
(2006).
This is easy to understand as applied to antiquities. In the absence of transaction costs
and strategic behavior, economics assumes that those who enjoy the positive externalities
from the antiquity would be willing to contribute towards its purchase price. If there were
no transaction costs or strategic behavior, theoretically a source country would outbid all
other bidders for an antiquity which constitutes cultural property for its people.
A neoclassical economic response to the source country's assertion that state
ownership/retention of newly discovered antiquities is an appropriate response to the market
failure is that transaction costs and strategic behavior can be eliminated by having the source
country tax its citizens to purchase the antiquity. Requiring the government to compensate
the party from whom property is taken is an efficient way to acquire a public good when
transaction costs and/or strategic behavior preclude purchasing the property interest in a
voluntary market transfer because it forces the government to assess the full costs of its state
ownership policy. Only if the benefits truly outweigh the costs of compensating the party
would the government acquire the property.
The rationale of the takings compensation requirement, however, does not apply to newly
discovered antiquities. The compensation requirement is to deter the government from
unduly burdening a minority of the community by taking their property. But a newly
discovered antiquity constitutes an unexpected windfall which can be awarded to either the
finder or the state. Awarding the property interest to the state does not constitute a "taking"
in the traditional sense of the doctrine. The finder never had a vested property right. It was
always contingent on no one with a superior right asserting claim to the found object. As
applied to antiquities, by claiming ownership of all unowned and undiscovered antiquities,
source countries have decided that they hold a superior right to the finder. Awarding the
property rights to newly discovered antiquities to the state does not involve the same public
policy considerations as does the classic takings scenario. Moreover, the state has a
legitimate interest in deterring finders from taking possession of newly discovered
antiquities. The state is claiming ownership not to unfairly burden a minority of the
populace but rather to advance a legitimate state interest in maximizing the social utility
associated with newly discovered antiquities. The economic arguments in favor of requiring
the state to compensate a party when the state "takes" property from the individual do not
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failure involving negative externalities is pollution. 10 8 If a factory that
produces widgets also produces pollution, the pollution is a negative
externality to those who live in the area. They are harmed by it, 10 9 but the
factory does not have to internalize the cost of the pollution in calculating
what it costs to produce its widgets.' 10 The result is that the market fails to
properly price the cost of widgets, leading to overproduction of widgets and
excessive pollution which harms those who live near the factory.
11 1
Government intervention is needed to correct the market failure by
requiring the factory to internalize the cost of its pollution."12
A classic example of market failure involving positive externalities is the
lighthouse example discussed above. 113 Because it is difficult to exclude
others from using and enjoying the light from the lighthouse, it is difficult
to charge them for enjoying the benefits of the lighthouse. 114 In contrast to
market failure involving negative externalities, which leads to
overproduction of the good or activity in question absent government
intervention, 115 market failure involving positive externalities leads to
underproduction of the good or activity in question absent government
intervention. 116 Hence, the reason most lighthouses were built and operated
by the government. "17
apply with equal relevance when the state claims ownership of all unowned and
undiscovered antiquities.
108. See Lee, supra note 107, at 479; Michael J. Podolsky, Note, The Use of the Discount
Rate in EPA Enforcement Actions, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1009, 1012 (2002); see also
Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 22-23
(1986).
109. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a general discussion of externalities.
110. See Podolsky, supra note 108, at 1012.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1013; see also Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to
Economic Growth and Development?, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 285, 321 (2003).
113. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see also Jacques LeBoeuf, The
Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San
Diego L. Rev. 555, 568 (1994).
114. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see also LeBoeuf, supra note 113, at
568.
115. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text; see also James T. Hamilton, Private
Interests in "Public Interest" Programming: An Economic Assessment of Broadcaster
Incentives, 45 Duke L.J. 1177, 1184 (1996); see, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Runoff and Reality:
Externalities, Economics, and Traceability Issues in Urban Runoff Regulation, 9 Chap. L.
Rev. 409, 420-22 (2006) (discussing the problem of excess pollution as the failure of the
market to internalize the costs associated with pollution).
116. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law:
Theory and Application, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 10 (2005); LeBoeuf, supra note 113, at 568.
117. Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, I UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 97, 100 (1994).
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6. Market Failure and Government Intervention
Traditional economic wisdom holds that market failure justifies
government intervention to maximize social welfare.1 18 One way to view
the prevailing source country ownership/retention approach to newly
discovered antiquities is that the substantial positive externalities associated
with the antiquities warrant government intervention. The intangible
architectural, historical, and cultural characteristics of the antiquity generate
incalculable benefits for the whole source country. 119 Where there are
substantial positive externalities associated with a good, market failure
usually occurs, justifying government intervention to maximize social
welfare. 120  Source countries have responded to the perceived market
failure with respect to newly discovered antiquities by adopting state
ownership/retention laws in an attempt to capture the positive externalities
and maximize their social welfare.
From an economic perspective, government intervention is assumed to be
necessary because without it the private market will not provide the
necessary incentive for the good to be provided at the efficient level-a
level which maximizes social welfare.121 Neoclassical economics assumes
that the non-excludability and non-rivalrous nature of the public good
means that the market will not be able to capture the positive externalities
associated with the good, leading to underproduction of the good. With
regard to antiquities, however, this assumption does not apply. Newly
discovered antiquities are not "produced," they are found.122 Historically,
the law of finders provided ample incentive for antiquities to be
"produced," i.e., found and brought to market. 123 In light of the success the
law of finders had in bringing newly discovered antiquities to market, it is
difficult to defend the prevailing source country ownership/retention
approach as necessary to counter the market failure caused by the
antiquities' positive externalities. A number of commentators have
implicitly or explicitly concluded as much, arguing that source countries
should return to a law of finders/market based approach to who owns newly
discovered antiquities. 124 That opinion, however, sees only the benefits
118. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principles of Microeconomics 163 (2d ed. 1997); Kochan,
supra note 115, at 425-26; William D. Rahm, Watching Over the Web: A Substantive
Equality Regime for Broadband Applications, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 30 (2007).
119. See Petr, supra note 49, at 518.
120. See supra notes 107, 116 and accompanying text.
121. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2821, 2879 (2006); Mary Eschelbach Hansen & Daniel Pollack, The Regulation of
Intercountry Adoption, 45 Brandeis L.J. 105, 108 (2006); Lee, supra note 107, at 479-81.
122. See David G. Bercaw, Requiem for Indiana Jones: Federal Law, Native Americans,
and the Treasure Hunters, 30 Tulsa L.J. 213, 214 (1994) (noting that finders acquire title to
found objects merely by taking possession of them-they do not create them).
123. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
124. See Paul M. Bator, The International Trade in Art 46 (1981) (arguing that the "best
way to keep art is to let a lot of it go"-a call to permit at least some market transactions);
Cohan, supra note 69, at 57 (discussing Professor Merryman's view); Amy E. Miller, The
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associated with the law of finders; it fails to take into consideration the
costs-the negative externalities.
E. The Law of Finders and Negative Externalities
The problem with the traditional law of finders as applied to newly
discovered antiquities is that its strength is also its weakness. The law of
finders rewards the finder who goes public with the found property.] 25 The
first step, however, is taking possession of the found item. Taking first
possession is what gives the finder superior rights over all but the true
owner. 126 But as applied to newly discovered antiquities, the moment the
finder takes possession of the antiquity, the damage has been done.
1. The Intangible Component of a Newly Discovered Antiquity
Much of the invaluable archeological, historical and/or cultural
information associated with the antiquity can only be captured while the
antiquity is still in the ground. 127 Once the finder takes possession of the
found antiquity-by removing it from the ground-the intangible
components of the antiquity have been compromised, if not destroyed. 128
Just as the law of first possession has been rightfully criticized for
contributing to the near extinction of certain wild animals, 129 the law of first
Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from the Disaster, 37
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 49, 83 (2005) (calling on source countries, to adopt a "managed
market" approach); Dalia N. Osman, Occupiers' Title to Cultural Property: Nineteenth-
Century Removal of Egyptian Artifacts, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 969, 996-99 (1999)
(calling for a repeal of the prevailing source country retention laws and adoption of a
managed market model); Villanueva, supra note 5, at 575-78 (discussing the idea of a local
registry system which would permit finders to sell some newly discovered antiquities).
125. Izuel, supra note 39, at 1670-71 (noting that "[c]ommentators speculate that courts
give the finder possession of a lost item as a reward for returning the item to circulation and
as an incentive to report the find").
126. See id. at 1671 (citing Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221 (Del. Super. Ct.
1980)); Keeping Current-Property, 18 Prob. & Prop. 20, 25 (2004) (citing Armory v.
Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.), for the central rule that "the right of a finder of
lost property to the item is good as against all the world, except the 'rightful' owner");
Joseph William Singer, Starting Property, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. 565, 566 (2002) (stating that
the law of finders generally means that an unowned find can be kept by the finder, and that a
find with an owner must be returned to said owner).
127. See Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 198-99; Nancy C. Wilkie, Public Opinion
Regarding Cultural Property Policy, 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 97, 101 n.10 (2001) (citing
Ricardo J. Elia, Looting, Collecting, and the Destruction of Archaeological Resources, 6
Nonrenewable Res. 85, 93 (1997) (discussing the destruction of an artifact's original
archeological context as the most serious consequence of looting); Borodkin, supra note 49,
at 382-84 (describing destruction of excavation sites).
128. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 198-99; Wilkie, supra note 127, at 100-01, 101 n.10
(citing Elia, supra note 127, at 93) (discussing the destruction of an artifact's original
archaeological context as the most serious consequence of looting); Borodkin, supra note 49,
at 382-84.
129. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that pursuit of a wild
animal is not sufficient to give rise to possession and that depriving an animal of its natural
liberty is possession); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in cDNA Sequences: A New
2007] 1035
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
possession should also be criticized for contributing to the destruction of
invaluable archeological, historical, and cultural information connected to
newly discovered antiquities. The law of finders, with its implicit
requirement of first possession,130 creates substantial negative externalities
as applied to newly discovered antiquities. Although the finder's action of
taking possession of the newly discovered antiquity generates substantial
benefit to the finder, the rest of society is harmed because the act of taking
possession damages, if not destroys, much of the invaluable, intangible
information connected to the antiquity. 131 Where an activity generates
substantial negative externalities, this is evidence of market failure. 132
Where there is market failure, government intervention may be needed to
increase social welfare. 133
Resident For the Public Domain, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 575, 576 (1996); Dean
Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. Legal Stud. 609,
627 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession,
86 Va. L. Rev. 535, 544 (2000) (explaining that one does not actually possess a wild animal
until he or she kills or traps the animal).
130. See Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. AtI. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 460 (4th
Cir. 1992); Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 501 (1861); Marian Leigh Miller, Underwater
Cultural Heritage: Is the Titanic Still in Peril as Courts Battle over the Future of the
Historical Vessel?, 20 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 345, 354-55 (2006). The problem is newly
discovered antiquities suffer from the "tragedy of the commons." See Hardin, supra note 65
(explaining the "tragedy of the commons" to be the concept that free access and unrestricted
demand for a resource that is in limited or finite supply will inevitably lead to
overexploitation of that resource). For all practical purposes, a finder considers a newly
discovered antiquity to be unowned property and assumes that to establish property rights in
the antiquity he or she needs to take possession of it, If the finder fails to take possession,
there is the risk that someone else may come along and find it, thereby establishing a
competing, if not a superior, claim. But as applied to newly discovered antiquities, taking
first possession generates substantial negative externalities in terms of the lost intangible
property.
131. Juliana V. Campagna, War or Peace: It Is Time for the United States to Ratify the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflicts, 17 Fla. J. Int'l L. 271, 285-86 (2005) ("The looting and loss of cultural property,
however, no differently from its illicit trade, causes irreparable loss and impoverishment to
the nation and inhabitants from which it is pillaged [and] also constitutes a harmful
impoverishment of the heritage of all nations of the world." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Josh Shuart, Is All 'Pharaoh' in Love and War? The British Museum's Title to the
Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx's Beard, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 667, 675 (2004) (discussing why
artifacts can only be appreciated by all in their original cultural context); see also supra
notes 127-28.
132. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev.
531, 547 (2005); Ari Bessendorf, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in
Climate Change, 28 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 325, 340-41 (2005); Roberta F. Mann, On
the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 587, 596
n.62 (2005).
133. Stiglitz, supra note 118, at 163; Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining
What to Regulate: Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 Admin. L. Rev.
269, 285 (2006) ("Traditional welfare economics argues that the existence of market failures
requires government intervention.").
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2. Government Intervention to Minimize Negative Externalities
Source country state ownership/retention rules, particularly the
ownership rules, are not so much an attempt at "taking" property from a
finder 134-so as to maximize positive externalities-as they are an attempt
at maximizing social welfare by minimizing the negative externalities
associated with the act of the finder taking possession. Under the state
ownership/retention approach, because all newly discovered antiquities are
essentially owned by the state, 135 in theory the finder has no incentive to
touch the antiquity. In the perfect economic world, the rational finder
realizes that he or she has no interest in the antiquity and therefore has no
incentive to exert any effort to take possession of it. The finder should
leave the antiquity where it is and report the find to the proper authorities.
Under these assumptions, the state ownership/retention approach would
maximize social welfare. It should result in greater archeological,
historical, and/or cultural property being produced because, after the find is
reported, trained archeologists will excavate the antiquity, gathering all the
available intangible information in the process and minimizing the harm to
the antiquity. 1 36
In practice, however, the state ownership/retention approach has proven
to be counterproductive. Rather than creating an incentive for finders of
newly discovered antiquities to report their finds, the state
ownership/retention form of government intervention has created an
incentive for finders to turn to the vast and thriving international black
market for illegally exported art. 137 While the exact magnitude of the
illegal sale of antiquities is unknown, estimates for the illegal international
sale of art range from a low of hundreds of millions to a high of billions of
dollars annually. 138 Some experts have opined that it is the second largest
form of international crime, behind only the international sale of
narcotics. 139 And it is widely acknowledged that the cause of the vast and
vibrant international black market for illegally exported antiquities that
effectively undermines the goal of retaining cultural property is the state
134. Some American commentators have argued that source country retention rules
constitute takings. See Borodkin, supra note 49, at 393.
135. See supra note 73.
136. Villanueva, supra note 5, at 579.
137. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 9-10; Dutra, supra note 61, at 66-68; Borodkin, supra
note 49, at 406; Julia A. McCord, Note, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New
Perspective on Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 Ind. L.J. 985, 997 (1995); Sue J. Park,
Note, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An Industrialized Source Nation's Difficulties
in Retaining and Recovering Its Antiquities, 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 931, 951 (2002).
138. Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen
Cultural Property, 38 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1177, 1178 (2005) ("[S]tolen art and antiquities
[are] ... estimated to net from one to ten billion dollars annually."); Chang, supra note 42, at
832-33 ("The income generated by illicit trade in art has been estimated to be as high as 6
billion dollars per year."); Moore, supra note 52, at 468 n. 12.
139. See Dutra, supra note 61, at 66-67; Borodkin, supra note 49, at 377-78; Moore,
supra note 52, at 468 n. 12.
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ownership/retention approach adopted by the source countries. 140
Moreover, these numbers do not tell the complete story.
In an attempt to hide the provenance of the illegally exported antiquities,
and thereby further their criminal enterprise, finders often destroy features
of the antiquity which may provide clues as to where and/or when the
antiquity was found. Artistic features may be defaced, 141 and priceless
archeological and historical information often is destroyed, 142 typically in a
manner which makes it impossible to recreate the information. 143 The goal
of the unscrupulous finder is to turn the newly discovered antiquity into an
archeological "orphan" whose lineage is unknown, thereby permitting
"foreign adoption" via the black market with minimal chances of the
"child" being reunited with its natural parent/source country. 144 The illegal
excavation and exportation of a newly discovered antiquity not only causes
the loss of the antiquity for the source country, it also causes intangible
archeological, historical, and cultural loss for the global community. 145
And while the source country's loss may be temporary-the illegally
exported antiquity may be recovered-the archeological, historical, and
cultural losses usually are permanent. 146 And these intangible losses are
incalculable.
The ineffectiveness of the prevailing source country form of market
intervention, the state ownership/retention laws, raises the question of
whether the intervention constitutes government failure. 147 Government
failure occurs because policy makers and legislators are not omniscient.
Even when well intentioned, efforts at government intervention may fail to
improve social welfare. 148 Under the state ownership/retention approach to
newly discovered antiquities, finders not only have an incentive to turn to
the black market to sell their newly discovered antiquities, 149 they have an
incentive to destroy much, if not all, of the intangible archeological,
140. See Cohan, supra note 55, at 357; Dutra, supra note 61, at 68; Osman, supra note
124, at 993.
141. See Borodkin, supra note 49, at 383; Park, supra note 137, at 932-33.
142. Cohan, supra note 69, at 7-8; Park, supra note 137, at 931-33; Kavita Sharma, Note,
From the Mayan Machaquila Stele to Egyptian Pharaoh Amenhotep's Head: United States
Courts' Enforcement of Foreign National Patrimony Laws After United States v. Schultz, 56
Hastings L.J. 749, 756 (2005).
143. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 7-8; Park, supra note 137, at 931-33.
144. See Osman, supra note 124, at 994 (noting the intentional destruction of antiquities
and their locus to facilitate removal and export); Borodkin, supra note 49, at 410-11; see
also Choi, supra note 53, at 192-93 (discussing how the process results in artwork that is
"divorced from its cultural roots").
145. While scholars argue over whether cultural property should be defined on a national
or international basis, all agree that the losses caused by the black market for illegally
exported antiquities is international. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 7-8.
146. See Szopa, supra note 62, at 65.
147. The "government failure theory" won the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics. John
Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle, 44 Va. J. Int'l L.
341,411 (2004).
148. See Morriss & Dudley, supra note 133, at 287.
149. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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historical, and cultural information associated with the find to minimize the
chances that their illegal activities will be discovered. 150  The harm
associated with the state ownership/retention approach may be worse than
its benefit.
A hard-line neoclassical economist may argue that the poor performance
of the state ownership/retention approach to date proves the neoclassical
view that market failure is always better than government intervention. 151
That may be overstating the case. At a minimum, however, the
ineffectiveness of the state ownership/retention approach qualifies the
traditional economic wisdom that market failure always justifies
government intervention. Market failure may justify government
intervention if the government intervention increases social welfare.' 52 The
issue is whether the state ownership/retention approach to newly discovered
antiquities increases social welfare.
II. THE STATE OWNERSHIP/RETENTION APPROACH
VERSUS THE LAW OF FINDERS APPROACH
A. Protecting the Tangible Component: The Incentive to Go Public
The principal problem with the state ownership/retention approach to
newly discovered antiquities is that it turns the incentive for the finder on its
head. While the traditional law of finders approach maximizes the
probability that the finder of a newly discovered antiquity will go public
with the find, 153 the state ownership/retention approach maximizes the
probability that the finder will not go public. 154 Under the law of finders,
the principal reason the finder came forward with the antiquity is the near
zero probability that anyone with a superior claim would claim the
antiquity. ' 55 The nature of the antiquity basically guaranteed that it would
be virtually impossible to prove who owned it.156 In the absence of a
150. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
151. See Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy
Implications of Open Source Software, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 45, 83 (2006); Joel M.
Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive
Discourse, 26 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 513, 526-27 (2005).
152. See Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev.
35, 61-62 (2007); Shanker A. Singham & D. Daniel Sokol, Public Sector Restraints:
Behind-the-Border Trade Barriers, 39 Tex. Int'l L.J. 625, 636 (2004).
153. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
156. See Jennifer S. Moorman, Finders Weepers, Losers Weepers?: Benjamin v. Lindner
Aviation, Inc., 82 Iowa L. Rev. 717, 722-23 (1997) (citing Ritz v. Selma United Methodist
Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1991)); Charles R. Walsh, Jr., Note, Sovereign
Ownership of Private Property in the Name of Preservation: A Contradiction in Terms and
of the Constitution, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 529, 537 (2003); see also Harris, supra note
38.
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superior claim, the finder is granted sole and exclusive ownership,
including the right to transfer it for valuable consideration. 157
Conversely, under the prevailing state ownership/retention approach, if
the finder goes public with the find there is near certainty that a superior
claim will be asserted: The state will claim the newly discovered antiquity,
or at least the right to restrict its export, 158 either way depriving the finder
of substantial economic benefit. Based on the vibrant black market for
illegally exported antiquities, many finders conclude that it makes no sense
for them to go public with the newly discovered antiquity under the
prevailing state ownership/retention approach.1 59 The cost of going public
with the found antiquity is obvious. At a minimum, the finder will lose the
item; and unlike the typical found item, which is of little value, the typical
found antiquity is worth thousands, if not millions, of dollars. 160 From an
economic perspective, it is easy to understand why finders are reluctant to
go public with the newly discovered antiquity under the state
ownership/retention approach.
Some may argue that the finder should feel satisfied at fulfilling a civic
duty furthering the source country's cultural heritage. 16 But most finders
fail to see the government's distinction between found antiquities and other
found property. 162 Inasmuch as the finder of other found property is
awarded title if the true owner does not step forward and claim the property,
157. See supra notes 44-48, 55-56 and accompanying text.
158. The state will either claim it completely or, under the state ownership/retention
approach, the state will claim the right to restrict the transfer of the found antiquity, thereby
depriving the finder of the financial benefit of the find. See supra notes 63-66, 73 and
accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (regarding the size of the black
market).
160. In 1972, the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) purchased the
Euphronios krater, a 2500-year-old vase, for $1 million. Vernon Silver, Met's Antiquities
Case Shows Donor, Trustee Ties to Looted Art, Archaeology News, Feb. 23, 2006,
http://www.archaeologynews.org/link.asp?ID=66673&Title=MET' S%20Antiquities%20Cas
e%20Shows%20Donor,%20Trustee%2OTies%20to%20Looted%2OArt. In 1994, a Nimrud
relief fragment was sold for almost $12 million. See John Malcom Russell, Stolen Stones:
The Modern Sack of Ninevah, Archaeology, Dec. 30, 1996,
http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/nineveh/. These antiquities are at the upper end
of the spectrum. In 1995, police in Switzerland recovered thousands of antiquities worth
millions of dollars from four warehouses. See Christine L. Green, Antiquities Trafficking in
Modern Times: How Italian Skullduggery Will Affect United States Museums, 14 Vill.
Sports & Ent. L.J. 35, 54-55 (2007); Andrew L. Slayman, The Trial in Rome, Archaeology,
Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/italytrial/. In addition, in some
countries, the state not only takes the found antiquity, the state also takes the land where it
was found because of its archeological significance-without compensation. See Osman,
supra note 124, at 993.
161. See Roger O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International
Community as a Whole?, 53 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 189, 192 (2004) (recognizing that states
have a duty to preserve mankind's cultural heritage).
162. For an exception to this, see Andrew L. Slayman, Where the Past Serves the Present,
Archaeology, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 79, 84 (reporting that the residents of Nevis, a Caribbean
island, routinely turn over newly discovered artifacts to the Nevis Historical and
Conservation Society).
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why should the finder of an antiquity not be treated likewise? Similarly
situated people should be treated the same, 163 and most finders do not see
the fact that the found item is an antiquity as justifying different treatment.
Some scholars agree, arguing that the state ownership/retention approach to
newly discovered antiquities is analogous to a taking for which the finder
should be compensated. 164  While not all agree with the "takings"
characterization, most acknowledge that the state ownership/retention
approach has played a key role in creating and sustaining the vibrant black
market that exists for the sale of illegally exported antiquities. 165
Source countries have tried to counter the incentive for a finder not to
report a newly discovered antiquity by imposing criminal penalties for the
failure to do so. 166  The problem is that failure to report the newly
discovered antiquity is the classic "victimless" crime.167 There is no one to
file a complaint. 168 The only party who knows of the crime is the
perpetrator, the finder. Source countries have to rely on law enforcement
authorities to discover the crime.1 69 Although there are no statistics as to
how successful source countries' criminal laws are at countering the
incentive for finders of newly discovered antiquities to turn to the black
market, the vibrant international black market for antiquities is evidence
that many finders do not consider the source countries' criminal laws and
enforcement activities much of a deterrent. 170 Moreover, once the antiquity
163. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra
Lyn Bassett, The End ofLaw, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2004).
164. See Stephanie D. Edelson, Note, Concerted International Effort in the Trade of
Cultural Property, 16 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1249 (1984); Goldberg, supra note 67, at
1052-53. See generally Walsh, supra note 156.
165. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
166. See Peter K. Tompa, Ancient Coins as Cultural Property: A Cause for Concern?, 4
J. Int'l Legal Stud. 69, 91-92 (1998) (stating that Turkey's Law on Protection of Cultural
and Natural Antiquities of 1983 makes one who does not report the discovery of movable
antiquities subject to criminal penalties).
167. See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim's Desire
for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 Wayne L. Rev. 1115, 1143 n. 132 (2004)
(defining "victimless crime"); Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case
of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 887, 891 n.8 (noting the possibility of a
"victimless" crime); Benji McMurray, The Mitigating Power of a Victim Focus at
Sentencing, 19 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 125, 126 (2006) ("In the case of 'victimless' crimes, the
premise is that all of society was harmed but that no one in particular was harmed.").
168. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
50 n.269 (1996); Eisenstat, supra note 167, at 1143 n.132; Manns, supra note 167, at 891
n.8.
169. See Lenese C. Herbert, Et In Arcadia Ego: A Perspective on Black Prosecutors'
Loyalty Within the American Criminal Justice System, 49 How. L.J. 495, 515 (2006)
(discussing "'victimless' crimes, more explicitly, those that rely solely upon police
testimony and witnessing of wrongdoing"); Scott C. Paton, "The Government Made Me Do
It": A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 Cornell L.
Rev. 995, 1032 (1994) (discussing the need for the government's use of undercover activity,
strategy, and even deception to detect victimless crimes in particular).
170. See, e.g., Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of
Opinion That Thwart UNESCO's Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property,
19 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 227, 229-30 (2005); see also Thomas R. O'Connor, Intelligence-Led
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leaves the country, the chances of that finder being charged and convicted
decrease significantly. 17 1 There appears to be widespread support for the
conclusion that the prevailing source country approach to protecting newly
discovered antiquities-state ownership coupled with criminal sanctions for
not reporting the find-is not very effective at getting finders to go public
with their finds. 172
B. Protecting the Intangible Component: The Archeological, Historical,
and/or Cultural Information
Under the traditional law of finders, the typical finder may accidentally
damage the archeological, historical, and other intangible information
associated with the newly discovered antiquity. 173 The typical finder is not
a trained archeologist and does not appreciate the importance, and fragility,
of the locus in quo of the find. 174 The finder's focus is on the tangible
antiquity itself, not the intangible archeological, historical, and/or cultural
information connected with the find. Accordingly, the typical finder will
extract the antiquity with little to no care for the intangible components of
the find. 175 But often the find will result in at least some of the intangible
information being secured. As long as the finder was not trespassing, the
finder has an incentive to disclose information concerning the find. 176 This
information will help to establish the provenance of the antiquity, and the
more information about the provenance, the more valuable the antiquity. 177
In addition, if the site of the find has not been damaged too much by the
untrained finder, there is a chance that some of the archeological, historical,
Policing and Transnational Justice, 2006 J. Inst. Just. Int'l Stud. 233, 233 ("Domestically,
regionally, and internationally, an effective strategy has been evasive with many forms of
vice and/or so-called victimless crimes."); supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text
(discussing the magnitude of the international black market for illegally exported art).
171. See Paige L. Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of
Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 Suffolk
Transnat'l L.J. 609, 611 (1992); Park, supra note 137, at 938.
172. See Nat'l Arts Journalism Prog., Ethics and Current Claims: Is There a Fair
Solution? (n.d.), available at http://www.najp.org/publications/conferencereports/122-
134%20Ethics%20and%20Current%20Claims.pdf. Some have even argued that imposing
criminal penalties actually deters people from reporting discoveries. Bator, supra note 55, at
318.
173. See Sharma, supra note 142, at 750; Szopa, supra note 62, at 63.
174. See Dutra, supra note 61, at 67; Roberts, supra note 51, at 333-34; Szopa, supra
note 62, at 63.
175. See Dutra, supra note 61, at 67; Roberts, supra note 51, at 333-34; Szopa, supra
note 62, at 63.
176. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. If, however, the finder was trespassing
when he or she found the item, at a minimum the finder will have an incentive not to
disclose where the item was found, and worse the finder may have an incentive to destroy
the archeological, historical, and other intangible information connected with the find in an
effort to minimize the chances that it will be discovered that he or she was trespassing when
the antiquity was found.
177. See Aaron M. Boyce, A Proposal to Combat the Illegal Trafficking of Pre-
Columbian Artifacts, 3 Hisp. L.J. 91, 129 (1997); Roberts, supra note 51, at 333-34;
Borodkin, supra note 49, at 383-84.
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and/or cultural property can be saved by proper excavation. The incentive
to go public with the find positively affects the chances that at least some of
the archeological, historical, and other intangible information connected
with the find can be salvaged.
In contrast, under the state ownership/retention approach, once the finder
decides to turn to the black market, the finder has an incentive intentionally
to destroy the archeological, historical, and cultural intangible information
connected with the find in an attempt to minimize discovery and
detection. 178  If the principal purpose of the state ownership/retention
approach is to counter the negative externalities associated with the law of
finders, 179 the case can be made that the negative externalities associated
with the government intervention may be as great as, if not greater than, the
negative externalities associated with the law of finders. No doubt the
drafters of the state ownership/retention approach realized the potential
for-though probably not the magnitude of-the negative externalities
associated with the approach, hence the criminal sanctions under the state
ownership/retention approach for those who violate it.' 80  From an
economic perspective, the goal is to offset the potential benefits of the black
market with the risk of criminal sanctions, but this offsetting risk comes at a
steep cost
C. Administrative Costs
From a law and economics perspective, laws are adopted to create
incentives for people to engage in socially desirable behavior. 18 1 At the
macro level, these incentives can be divided into two categories: laws
either "reward" a party for acting in the socially desirable manner, or laws
"punish" a party for not acting in the socially desirable manner. 182 In
178. See Maria Aurora Fe Candelaria, The Angkor Sites of Cambodia: The Conflicting
Values of Sustainable Tourism and State Sovereignty, 31 Brook. J. Int'l L. 253, 270 n.102
(2005); Borodkin, supra note 49, at 410-11; Choi, supra note 53, at 192-93 (noting that
"participant[s] in the illicit antiquities market [have] an incentive to strip as much
information as possible from an artifact before it enters the. . . legitimate art market").
179. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
181. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for
Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 434, 434-36 (1995) (arguing that
contributory fault is used within criminal law to provide incentives for victims to act in more
socially desirable ways); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory
and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775, 785 (1997).
182. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L.
Rev. 1481, 1564 (2006) (critiquing the logic of strategic incentive analysis); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy,
1990 Duke L.J. 1, 5; Mark D. West, Losers: Recovering Lost Property in Japan and the
United States, 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 369, 414-16 (2003); Note, Immunizing the Internet, or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Worm, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2442, 2458-59
(2006) (discussing how either criminal laws or cash rewards could be used to try to influence
the behavior of computer hackers).
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general, laws that reward are more efficient than laws that punish. 183 Laws
that reward typically are self effectuating. The traditional law of finders is a
good example. With minimal administrative costs, it creates an incentive
for the party to act in the socially desirable manner-for the finder to come
forward with the found property. 184 If the finder comes forward and the
true owner does not reclaim the item within a reasonable period of time, the
finder is awarded title.' 8 5 For the most part, the law is self effectuating.
There is minimal administrative cost imposed on public resources. 186
On the other hand, laws that create incentives by punishing people tend
not to be self effectuating. Criminal laws are a good example. Members of
society who might be tempted to engage in behavior that society has
decided is not socially desirable run the risk of being punished, but only if
they (1) engage in the behavior, (2) are caught, and (3) are convicted. 187
The punishment approach to creating incentives inherently includes
significantly higher administrative costs: (1) there must be a police force to
investigate and arrest the party; 188 (2) there must be a judicial system to try
the party; 189 and (3) there must be a penal system to punish the party. 190
183. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Peace by Other Means: Using Rewards in UN Efforts to
End Conflicts, 26 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 235, 245-48 (1998).
184. See West, supra note 182, at 372 (recognizing that the Japanese finders' law
"creates... incentives to encourage finders to report their finds and disincentives to
misappropriation").
185. See id. at 372 (describing Japanese finders' law). The traditional law of finders also
creates a reciprocal duty/benefits mentality where finders come forward with someone else's
property in the hope and expectation that if someone finds an item they have lost, that finder
will come forward, thereby maximizing the probability that they will get their own property
back.
186. That is not to say that the law of finders is without administrative costs. In many
jurisdictions, the duty to come forward includes the duty to turn the found property over to
the police during the time the original owner has the right to return and reclaim. See id. at
372, 380. It should also be acknowledged, however, that where a finder intentionally does
not make reasonable efforts to find the true owner, the finder can be held civilly liable for
conversion, if not criminally liable for theft. See Brown, supra note 47, § 3.5.
187. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 182, at 10-11; Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Punitive Awards After BMW, A New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998
Wis. L. Rev. 387, 398 (analogizing the imposition of punitive damages with the imposition
of criminal liability); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 Tex. L. Rev.
515, 653 (2004).
188. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 344, 356-57 (2003); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L.J. 315, 320
(1984).
189. See Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 188, at 356-57; Seidman, supra
note 188, at 320.
190. See Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 188, at 356-57; Margaret H.
Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality
or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1250 n.184 (2006); Seidman, supra
note 188, at 320. See generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reviving a Natural Right: The
Freedom of Autonomy, 42 Willamette L. Rev. 123 (2006) (discussing alleged inefficiencies
in the current criminal and lawmaking systems).
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The prevailing state ownership/retention approach to protecting newly
discovered antiquities is not nearly as self effectuating as the law of finders.
Because the state ownership/retention approach creates an incentive for a
finder not to go public with the find, to be effective it requires an offsetting
sanctions component. 19 1  The administrative costs associated with this
"stick" approach are substantial. Because the failure to report the find is a
victimless crime, rarely is there a complaining party to start the process.
Source countries must maintain an extensive and expensive law
enforcement system devoted to this cause if they are to have much of an
impact. 192 The source countries' financial resources are not up to the
challenge. Despite the source countries' statutory prohibitions and law
enforcement efforts, the thriving international black market evidences that a
substantial percentage, if not a majority, of all newly discovered antiquities
are illegally exported. 93 The result is that source countries have to take an
international approach to a problem created by their rejecting an
international approach to the issue. Source countries must rely on
consuming countries expending resources to help enforce the laws of the
source countries. 194 In addition, the ensuing litigation to recover antiquities
that the source countries claim were illegally exported has had a chilling
effect on the market for all antiquities. 195 Many antiquities lack a proper
paper trail of their provenance.' 96 The costs, administrative and other,
associated with the prevailing source country approach to state
ownership/retention are substantial.197
The logical issue is whether the prevailing source country approach to
newly discovered antiquities, the state ownership/retention approach, has
improved social welfare. Intuitively, doubts can be raised due to the
191. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
193. See Chauncey D. Steele IV, Note, The Morgantina Treasure: Italy's Quest for
Repatriation of Looted Artifacts, 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 667, 682-85 (2000)
(discussing the role of auction houses in the illegal antiquities market despite national and
international cultural property law).
194. See Bator, supra note 55, at 327; Chang, supra note 42, at 837.
195. See William G. Pearlstein, Claims for the Repatriation of Cultural Property:
Prospects for a Managed Antiquities Market, 28 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 123, 124-25, 130
(1996).
196. See Simon R.M. Mackenzie, Dig a Bit Deeper: Law, Regulation and the Illicit
Antiquities Market, 45 Brit. J. Criminology 249, 253 (2005) (stating that "documentary
evidence of a past chain of ownership is notably absent from most transactions in the
antiquities market, [and it is usually] impossible for purchasers to tell whether the object that
they buy has been recently looted, or [whether it] has been circulating in the market for
many years"); Jason M. Taylor, Note, The Rape and Return of China's Cultural Property:
How Can Bilateral Agreements Stem the Bleeding of China's Cultural Heritage in a Flawed
System?, 3 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 233, 234 (2006) (noting that "seventy-five percent of
all antiquities [sold] in London auctions have no published provenance").
197. See supra notes 188-90, 192 and accompanying text. This assessment of costs fails
to take into account the added costs imposed as a result of (1) the loss to consumers in
consuming countries from not being able to see the antiquities, and (2) the loss to those who
hold valid title to the antiquity but either cannot sell it or must sell it at a reduced price due to
the chill caused by the source countries' approach to the antiquities market.
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negative externalities and high administrative costs associated with the
approach. 198 Practically, it is impossible to know because it is impossible
to ascertain hard data on (1) how many newly discovered antiquities are
being illegally exported, (2) how many archeological sites are being
damaged/destroyed, (3) what percentage of illegally exported antiquities
will be recovered, and (4) the administrative costs associated with the
approach. In light of the obvious costs and potential costs associated with
the state ownership/retention approach, the question that arises is whether
there is another approach to protecting newly discovered antiquities which
may constitute a better chance at achieving the socially desirable goal of
improving social welfare.
III. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PROTECTING NEWLY
DISCOVERED ANTIQUITIES
A. Return to the Traditional Law of Finders
One popular proposal for improving protection of newly discovered
antiquities is to return to the traditional law of finders approach: Award
sole and complete ownership of the antiquity to the finder.199 Compared to
the state ownership/retention approach, the traditional law of finders
approach maximizes the chances that the finder will go public with his or
her find.200 The traditional law of finders approach also helps to protect the
physical characteristics and to some degree, the provenance of a newly
discovered antiquity: The better the condition of the antiquity, and the
more information about the antiquity, the greater its value. 20 1  The
traditional law of finders would obviate the international black market for
newly discovered antiquities. Finders could openly sell the antiquities to
the highest bidder. The global community, particularly museums in
consuming countries, would benefit from the increased supply of
antiquities.
But the proposals to return to the law of finders harkens back to the
cultural nationalism versus cultural internationalism debate. 20 2 Giving the
finder exclusive and absolute property rights in the newly discovered
antiquity will maximize the probability that the antiquity will end up in a
consuming country's museum or collector's hands.20 3  Whether this
maximizes social welfare depends on who constitutes "the society"-the
198. See supra notes 137-46.
199. See supra notes 38, 48-50 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative
Response to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003, 13 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol'y
381, 395-96 (2003); Merryman, supra note 58, at 831-32; David Rudenstine, Cultural
Property: The Hard Question of Repatriation: The Rightness and Utility of Voluntary
Reparation, 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 69, 69-71 (2001).
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country of origin or the global community? Collectively, antiquity
consumers in market countries typically have greater financial resources
than source countries. 204 Market country antiquity consumers typically
outbid source countries' consumers, with the result being that source
country archeological artifacts will be depleted, causing substantial cultural
and economic loss to source countries. 205
Acting as rational self-interested actors, source countries have concluded
that the proposals to return to the traditional law of finders approach to
protect newly discovered antiquities are not in their best interests. There is
little doubt that the traditional law of finders approach fails to maximize the
cultural benefits and social welfare of the source country. Moreover,
although individual finders of newly discovered antiquities look with
disdain on the state ownership/retention laws, as evidenced by the thriving
black market for illegally exported antiquities, there is widespread public
support within source countries for cultural nationalism and the state
ownership/retention approach.206  No doubt source country legislators
realize the political gain to be reaped by philosophically adopting cultural
nationalism and by legally adopting state ownership/retention laws. Source
countries are unlikely to return to the traditional law of finders approach
because of its potential for antiquities to be exported-a politically
unacceptable option.20 7 The source countries' refusal to return to the law of
finders approach is consistent with the public choice school of law and
economics. 20 8 The source countries are simply acting as rational actors
204. See Merryman, supra note 58, at 831-32; William D. Rogers, The Legal Response to
the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 932, 933-34 (1973).
205. Graham Green, Evaluating the Application of the National Stolen Property Act to
Art Trafficking Cases, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 251, 252 (2007); Merryman, supra note 58, at
831-32; Rogers, supra note 204, at 933.
206. The number and size of source country protests demanding the return pursuant to
source country ownership/retention laws is increasing. See Malcolm Moore, Italian Villagers
Fight New York's Met for 2600-Year-Old Chariot, Daily Telegraph (London), at 19,
available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/09/wchariotO9.xml;
Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly: Athens Protest Seeks Return of Elgin Marbles, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 2007, at E2 (reporting protest involving approximately 2000 students and
teachers who formed a chain around the Acropolis to draw attention to Greece's request that
Britain return the Elgin Marbles); see also Sarah Gauch, In Hot Pursuit of Egypt's Lost
Mummies, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 4, 2007, at 7 (describing the tactics used by the
investigator who is leading the campaign as being controversial outside of Egypt but that
"his calls to return national treasures" is playing well in Egypt).
207. Increasingly, source country politicians are leading the campaign for the return of
antiquities, an implicit acknowledgment of the widespread public support for such actions.
Moore, supra note 206. Similarly, politicians in consuming countries are resisting calls for
repatriation or even loans where they believe there is political gain to be had. See Bitter
Battle over Bust's True Home, N.Z. Herald, May 11, 2007, at B03, available at,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/category/story.cfm?c-id= 18&objectid= 10439055.
208. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 33, at 60 ("[Piublic choice applies economic
theory to politics, treating politicians and bureaucrats as rational maximizers of their own
self-interests, rather than as servants of some mythic public interest."); Richard A. Posner,
Catastrophe: Risk and Response 133 (2004) ("The term 'public choice' refers to a body of
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maximizing their self-interest. Return to the traditional law of finders
approach, while theoretically appealing in some respects, is not practically
and politically viable.
B. Compensate the Finder/Finder's Fee Approach
Another possible approach to protecting newly discovered antiquities is a
modified law of finders approach. There are several variations to this
approach, but each basically requires the source country to compensate the
finder in exchange for the source country taking possession and ownership
of the newly discovered antiquity. The issue is how much compensation
the source country should be required to pay.
A handful of source countries offer the finder a finder's fee in exchange
for reporting the find.209 The problem is that the finder's fee is usually
either (1) a fixed sum that is substantially less than the market value of the
antiquity (or what the finder thinks is the market value210 or the black
market value of the antiquity), or (2) a percentage of the fair market value
of the antiquity as determined by the government (without the benefit of the
finder being able to test the market). 211 Either way, the bottom line offer
scholarship in economics and political science that tries to explain public policy as the
outcome of rationally self-interested behavior.").
209. See Joseph L. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in
Cultural Treasures 185 (1999) (listing Iraq and Sudan as two such countries at the time of
publication). Italy also offers a finder's fee to the owner of the property-not necessarily the
finder-where the item was found. Stephanie Doyal, Implementing the UNIDROIT
Convention on Cultural Property into Domestic Law: The Case of Italy, 39 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 657, 677 n.88 (2001). China also offers a finder's fee to those who report a
found antiquity to the state. See Dutra, supra note 61, at 88.
210. See Dutra, supra note 61, at 88. In addition, often there are administrative
requirements which complicate, and cloud, the issue of whether the fee must be paid.
Although Italy offers a finder's fee that in theory can reach up to twenty-five percent of the
value of the found property, the found property must "immediately" be turned over to the
state to be entitled to the finder's fee. See Doyal, supra note 209, at 677. In addition,
finder's fees are determined administratively and there is no opportunity to test the market.
Id.; see also Dutra, supra note 61, at 88. Lastly, in some countries, after reporting the find,
the state may also take the land where it was found, without compensation, because of its
archeological significance. See Osman, supra note 124, at 993. Any finder's fee would
likely pale in comparison to the loss of land.
211. For example, Italy offers a percentage which in no event can exceed twenty-five
percent of the value of the found antiquity, but the government determines the fee. While
the finder can appeal the fee, the finder bears all costs associated with the appeal. See Doyal,
supra note 209, at 677 n.88. The Chinese finder's fee is even smaller. See Dutra, supra note
61, at 88. In the case of the Elmali Hoard, an American collector purchased a hoard of
almost 2000 ancient coins for $3.2 million. When Turkey learned of the coins, it brought
suit claiming the coins had been illegally exported and seeking return of the coins. Under
pending litigation that looked bleak from the purchaser's perspective, the American collector
decided to "voluntarily" return the coins. The Turkish government gave him a medal in the
shape of a coin. One can only speculate what the Turkish government would have given the
original finder, but one can only assume that it would have paled in comparison to the coins'
estimated value of $10 million. See Jason McElroy, The War Against the Illegal Antiquities
Trade: Rules of Engagement for Source Nations, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 547, 557-
59 (2005).
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typically is relatively low. The current practice of finders favoring the
black market over offers of finder's fees from the source country supports
the conclusion that finder's fees would have to be significantly increased to
create the necessary incentive for finders to come forward with a newly
discovered antiquity 2 12 The ultimate finder's fee would be to require the
state to purchase the find at full market value, which is similar to the export
licensing approach adopted by England.2 13
The English approach awards property rights to the finder, but the
government is granted a right in the find: the right to purchase the item
before it is exported by matching any offer made by a third party.2 14 This
approach gives the finder the right to test the market and to secure full
financial value for finding the antiquity, while giving the government the
benefit it seeks: the right to retain all archeological artifacts that it deems
worthy of retaining. Any archeological artifact the country is not interested
in retaining can then be sold on the international market to the highest
bidder, thereby meeting some of the international demand by museums and
collectors for antiquities.
From a theoretical perspective, adopting the English approach is a "win-
win" for all parties involved. Finders have an incentive to come forward
with their finds and to preserve and protect the physical characteristics and
provenance of the find. Source countries would have the right to retain the
antiquities that they want. Museums and collectors in market countries
would have the opportunity to acquire some antiquities, though probably
not the most culturally sensitive ones.
The problem is that while in theory the English model should work in
most source countries, in practice it would not. England is a country that is
relatively poor in newly discovered antiquities 2 15 of significance and
relatively rich in revenues. 2 16 The English approach is rarely applied so it
costs relatively little. England can afford such an approach. On the other
hand, most source countries are antiquities-rich but revenue-poor. 2 17 If a
source country were to adopt such an approach and attempt to implement it
with respect to most, if not all, newly discovered antiquities it wished to
retain, the result would be a financial disaster. The full compensation
212. See Stephanie Doyal, supra note 209, at 677 n.88; Dutra, supra note 61, at 88; see
also Sax, supra note 209, at 185; Borodkin, supra note 49, at 412-13.
213. See Tompa, supra note 166, at 101-02; Borodkin, supra note 49, at 392.
214. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 213 n.59. For other examples of first refusal states,
see Roberts, supra note 51, at 345; Tompa, supra note 166, at 76; Goldberg, supra note 67,
at 1038.
215. See Lila Johnson, Order from Chaos? The Current Status of International Law
Regarding the Illegal Exportation of Cultural Property from Latin America, 9 L. & Bus.
Rev. Am. 419, 420 (2003); Margules, supra note 171, at 613 n.19; Anne Carlisle Schmidt,
The Confuciusornis Sanctus: An Examination of Chinese Cultural Property Law and Policy
in Action, 23 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 185, 190-91 (2000).
216. See Johnson, supra note 215, at 420; Margules, supra note 171, at 613; Schmidt,
supra note 215, at 190-91.
217. See Margules, supra note 171, at 613; Rogers, supra note 204, at 933-34; Schmidt,
supra note 215, at 190-91.
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approach would bankrupt the source country. From a practical perspective,
the full finder's fee approach is politically and economically unacceptable
to source countries.
Source countries are stuck between a rock and a hard place. If they
continue with their current state ownership/retention approach, in theory
they protect their archeological artifacts, but in practice much, if not most,
of the newly discovered antiquities end up on the international black
market, which undermines the socially desirable goal of retaining this
cultural property within the source country.218 If the source countries return
to the traditional law of finders approach, or adopt a reasonable finder's
fee/compensation approach, finders will no longer have an incentive to turn
to the black market; 219 however, the source countries will not have the
resources to purchase all found antiquities, resulting in many, if not most, of
the newly discovered antiquities ending up on the legal international market
for antiquities and ultimately being transferred to museums or collectors in
market countries. Either way, the source country loses.
C. Protecting the Intangible Component: Negative Externalities
Moreover, both the traditional law of finders approach and the finder's
fee approach do little to protect the intangible archeological, historical, and
cultural components of a newly discovered antiquity. Both approaches
reward a finder for coming forward with the find, but coming forward with
the find invariably involves excavating and taking first possession of the
antiquity. When excavation is performed by an untrained finder, much, if
not all, of the historical and archeological value of the antiquity is lost
forever.220 Ideally, newly discovered antiquities should be excavated by
archeologists to maximize protection for the antiquity's historical and
archeological information.221 The problem is that finders will be reluctant
to leave a newly discovered antiquity in the ground because of the "tragedy
of the commons. ' 222 If the finder does not take physical possession of the
218. See Taylor, supra note 196, at 234 ("In large part, the current international regime is
inadequate in controlling the flourishing black market of international antiquity trade.
Despite an international effort to stem illicit import of cultural property, nearly 'seventy-five
percent of all antiquities offered for sale in London auctions have no published
provenance."' (quoting Hannah Beech, Spirited Away, TimeAsia, Oct. 13, 2003, available at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501031020/story.html)).
219. See Tompa, supra note 166, at 101-02.
220. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
221. See Aaron Kyle Briggs, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the International
Restitution of Cultural Property, 7 Chi. J. Int'l L. 623, 627 (2007); John Henry Merryman,
Museum Ethics, 1 Art & Museum L.J. 93, 99 (2006).
222. Andrea McDowell, Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 735, 775
(2007) ("[T]he rule of capture affects the commons by promoting possible wasteful
competition and depletion of resources and overinvestment in technology-in short, 'the
tragedy of the commons.'"); Andre Verani, Community-Based Management of Atlantic Cod
by the Georges Bank Hook Sector: Is It a Model Fishery?, 20 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 359, 361
(2007) ("Such conditions arise from the open-access situation that Hardin termed the
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newly discovered antiquity, another finder may come along, take
possession, and reap all the benefits. 223  Moreover, although the state
ownership/retention approach in theory protects the intangible component
of a newly discovered antiquity, 224 in practice it may do more harm than
good to the archeological, historical, and cultural information connected to
the find. 225
The challenge is to craft a financially viable approach that creates the
proper incentives for the finder of a newly discovered antiquity while
upholding the source country's socially desirable goal of maximizing and
retaining its archeological artifacts. The proposals to date have struggled to
find the proper balance between the competing interests because they
typically assume an "all or nothing" approach to allocating property rights
to the newly discovered antiquity: that fee simple in the antiquity had to be
given either to the finder or to the state. The problem is that if fee simple is
awarded to the finder, the state holds no interest, and the finder has the right
to transfer the property to whomever he or she wishes. On the other hand,
if fee simple to the antiquity is awarded to the state, the finder holds no
interest and has no incentive to come forward with the find. The fee simple
mentality offers no viable solution to the dilemma, other than awarding the
property interest to the finder and requiring the state to compensate the
finder for the find, an economically unacceptable option for source
countries. An alternative approach is to split the property interest in a
newly discovered antiquity between the finder and the source country: to
adopt a possessory estate and future interest approach.
IV. THE POSSESSORY ESTATE AND FUTURE INTEREST APPROACH
A. Introduction
Adopting a possessory estate and future interest approach to who owns a
newly discovered antiquity provides an economically viable solution that
maximizes the protection of both the tangible and the intangible
components while balancing the competing interests of the finder and the
source country. "[J]ust as property can be divided physically, property
'Tragedy of the Commons,' wherein all the individuals and groups of people take as much as
possible from a free resource without considering the common need for conservation.").
223. Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1673,
1697 (2007) ("Having physical possession of the thing transferred, the appropriating party
can rightfully exclude any and every third party who does not already have possession of it.
Vis-A-vis such others, first possession is the basis of entitlement."); Richard A. Epstein, How
to Create-or Destroy-Wealth in Real Property, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 742 (2007) ("The
backbone of the common law system of property rights is the rule of first possession, which
allows individuals to acquire property over which they enjoy rights of use or disposition.").
224. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
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rights can be divided temporally."226 Possessory rights and future interests
split property rights over time. The party who holds the possessory estate
has the right to possess the property at that moment.227 The party who
holds the future estate has the present right to possess the property in the
future, when the possessory estate ends.228 Property rights in a newly
discovered antiquity could be awarded to both the finder and the source
country: The finder could be awarded a term of years, 229 and the source
country could be awarded the future interest in fee simple absolute. 230 A
term of years can be for any fixed period of time231 and is transferable. 232
B. The Incentive to Go Public with Found Property
As long as the term of years is transferable, the finder has an incentive to
go public with the find. The finder can transfer his or her term of years,
thereby realizing a financial return on his or her find. The issue is whether
this incentive is greater than the incentive to turn to the black market.233 As
long as the term of years is of reasonable duration, the value of the term of
years should be greater to the finder than the value of the antiquity on the
black market. Finders of antiquities who turn to the black market typically
226. Peter T. Wendel, A Possessory Estates & Future Interests Primer 1 (3d ed. 2007);
David M. Becker, Eroding the Common Law Paradigm for Creation of Property Interests
and the Hidden Costs of Law Reform, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 773, 778 (2005).
227. See Wendel, supra note 226, at 1; Ronald R. Volkmer, Nebraska's "Total Return
Trust" Statute: Unitrust Conversion and the Challenges of Managing a Trust and Drafting
a Trust, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 135, 138 (2007).
228. See Wendel, supra note 226, at 1-2; Becker, supra note 226, at 782.
229. A term of years is a finite possessory estate where the end date can be calculated on
the first day. Black's Law Dictionary 1478 (7th ed. 1999); Wendel, supra note 226, at 42,
46. In many respects, it is easier to conceive of a system which would award the finder a life
estate. A life estate is a possessory estate, the duration of which is the duration of the party's
life. Life is fragile. A life estate can end at any moment. The uncertainty of a life estate
reduces its value as compared to a term of years for a comparable number of years. See
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J.
1, 36 (1992) (explaining the risk associated with a life estate).
230. There is an interesting issue here of whether the future interest should be called a
reversion or a remainder. If the future interest following a finite estate (here, a term of
years) is retained by the grantor, it is called a reversion; if the future interest following a
finite estate is granted to a third party, it is called a remainder. Wendel, supra note 226, at
47. Because the newly discovered antiquity is not really being "conveyed" but rather the
property rights are being awarded as a matter of law, it appears to make more sense to call
the source country's future interest a reversion. Fee simple absolute is the most complete
form of ownership. In theory, it lasts forever; there is no future interest that follows it. Id. at
6-7. It is what the layperson thinks of as complete ownership.
231. As long as the last day is calculable on the first day, the interest is a term of years,
regardless of the duration of the period. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 229, at
1478; Wendel, supra note 226, at 46.
232. See Wendel, supra note 226, at 50; see also Lisa A. St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and
Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful Migration, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 19
(1992).
233. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 8-9; see also Sax, supra note 209, at 185; Warring,
supra note 170, at 276-77; Borodkin, supra note 49, at 412.
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get but a small fraction of the value of the antiquity. 234 In addition, the
black market value has to be discounted by the added risks the finder takes
by turning to the black market. If caught, the finder will be fined, if not
imprisoned. 235 If finders were presented with the option of a limited, but
valuable, property right which is transferable, the likely result is that most
finders would opt to come forward with their find. It would be to their
financial advantage.
C. Protection of the Newly Discovered Antiquity's Intangible Component
In addition, the possessory estate and future interest approach can be
used to maximize protection of the intangible components of a newly
discovered antiquity. To maximize protection of the archeological,
historical, and cultural components of a newly discovered antiquity there
must be an incentive for the finder to leave the antiquity in the ground
where it is found to permit an archeologist to excavate the antiquity. 236 All
things being equal, finders are unlikely to do so because of the risk that
another finder may come along and claim the antiquity. 237 A possessory
estate and future interest approach to allocating property rights can provide
an incentive for finders to behave in the socially desired manner. If the law
granted the finder an extended term of years for not taking possession of the
newly discovered antiquity, the longer term of years would provide a
financial incentive for finders to leave excavation to the archeologists.
D. Incentive to Expedite Excavations
The extended transferable term of years could also be used to maximize
protection of newly discovered antiquities by creating an incentive to
expedite the excavation process with respect to all newly discovered
antiquities. It is widely acknowledged that museums in consuming
countries are interested in obtaining rights to exhibit newly discovered
234. See Borke, supra note 203, at 394 ("The original finder of an antiquity that is traded
on the illicit market receives less than 2% of the price paid by the final purchaser.");
Borodkin, supra note 49, at 378 ("Typically, middlemen retain most of the profits in the
antiquities black market, while the finders of artifacts often receive less than one percent of
the retail value of their discoveries."). This is not to say that the antiquity is actually sold for
a small fraction of its value, but rather that the finder will receive only a small fraction of the
value. While an antiquity's value on the black market may be less than the value of a
legitimate antiquity, the value can still be considerable. For example, a Turkish farmer who
ran over the sculpted leg of a grand marble Hellenistic table turned down a local offer of
$1500 and took the sculpture to Istanbul, where he received $7000. The sculpture was
eventually sold to the Atlantis Gallery for $540,000 and was then listed for sale at $850,000.
See Geraldine Norman, Talking Turkey, Indep. (London), June 13, 1993, at 86-87.
235. Criminal punishment for looting antiquities has not proven very effective as a
deterrent. A former head of Peru's National Institute of Culture said that looting is "almost
as profitable as the cocaine trade, but without the risks." Nathaniel C. Nash, Poor Peru
Stands by as Its Rich Past Is Plundered, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1993, at A3.
236. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
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antiquities. 238  Directors of many of the leading consuming country
museums have gone on record as opposing cultural nationalism because it
restricts the flow of antiquities to consuming country museums.239 Scholars
have openly acknowledged that the source countries' ownership/retention
approach to newly discovered antiquities has reduced the supply of
antiquities to the frustration of museums in consuming countries. 240 A
possessory estate and future interest approach could be used to bring source
countries and Western museums back together for the common goal of
protecting newly discovered antiquities. Source countries could offer
museums that fund archeological digs (1) first right to purchase the term of
years of any antiquities discovered during the dig, and/or (2) the exclusive
option to acquire an even longer term of years. Increasing funding for more
archeological excavations maximizes protection of all newly discovered
antiquities by securing as much historical and archeological information as
possible and by ensuring acquisition of the antiquity before natural
elements cause any further deterioration to both the tangible and intangible
components of the find.241  Absent extraordinary circumstances which
justify leaving the antiquity in its natural state, most parties agree that the
best protection for an antiquity is not in the ground subject to the elements
but rather in protective custody where it can be preserved and studied.242
Granting museums in consuming countries either an exclusive option on
antiquities unearthed during an archeological dig that the museum funds, or
a longer term of years for all antiquities discovered during the dig, would be
a "win-win" for the finder, the museum, the source country, and all who
enjoy antiquities and the archeological, historical, and cultural information
connected to the antiquities.
E. Distribution of Costs
Moreover, the funding museums would be in the best position to
distribute the costs associated with the archeological dig and acquisition of
the term of years. The museum could partner with universities, and source
country museums, and hire local source country citizens to conduct the
excavation work. 243 Universities could contribute to the costs and provide
238. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 68; Merryman, supra note 58, at 847; Taylor, supra
note 196, at 252. See generally Knox, supra note 58.
239. See generally Knox, supra note 58; Merryman, supra note 58.
240. See Cohan, supra note 69, at 57-58; Merryman, supra note 58, at 847. See generally
Pearlstein, supra note 195.
241. See Bator, supra note 55, at 295-98 (discussing the preservation of newly discovered
antiquities); Aisha Y. Salem, Finders Keepers? The Repatriation of Egyptian Art, 10 J. Tech.
L. & Pol'y 173, 179 (2005); Warring, supra note 170, at 261.
242. See Briggs, supra note 221, at 627, 646; Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the
Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of
Retention Schemes, 26 Hous. J. Int'l L. 449, 495-96 (2004). Source and consuming
countries disagree, however, about in which country protective custody should occur.
243. See Kevin F. Jowers, International and National Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural
Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention, the United States, and Mexico, 38 Tex. Int'l L.J.
145, 146 n.6 (2003); Lynn S. Waterman, Was the Stela "Stolen "?, 2 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L.
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man power (faculty, students, and alumni) for the excavation. The
universities' participation would not only provide an additional source of
funding, it also would facilitate educating the public at large and the
individuals who participate in the excavation about the importance of
proper protection of newly discovered antiquities. The funding museums
could offset the costs of funding the archeological dig and acquiring the
term of years interest through their endowments, their fund-raising efforts,
their admission fees to see the exhibits, and by partnering with universities
and seeking contribution from the universities to help cover the expenses.
From an economic perspective, creating an incentive for consuming
museums to get involved in the excavation process would further maximize
protection of newly discovered antiquities. Interestingly, the United States
and Italy recently entered into an agreement to encourage long-term
exchanges of objects of archeological or artistic interest and to encourage
"American museums and universities jointly to propose and participate in
excavation projects authorized by the Ministry of Culture, with the
understanding that certain of the scientifically excavated objects from such
projects could be given as a loan to the American participants through
specific agreements with the Ministry of Culture .... -244 All that is
missing is the incentive for the finder to report the archeological site to the
Ministry of Culture-an incentive the American museums and universities
should be encouraged jointly to participate in creating/funding.
F. Administration
While the possessory estate and future interest approach may appear, at
first blush, to be a radical departure from previous approaches to allocating
property rights to newly discovered antiquities, in application there are
existing practices which the parties can draw upon in implementing this
approach. First, it is fairly common for museums to loan artwork or
Rev. 515, 534 (1992). The knowledge that going public with the find could translate intojobs for the local community, working on the dig, would only add to the finder's incentive to
go public with the find. Not only would the finder receive enhanced standing within the
community, no doubt a job working on the dig could be found for the finder. In Italy, the
government has hired known tombaroli, or grave robbers, to help locate and excavate
archeological sites. See Villanueva, supra note 5, at 575.
There is a long history of museums and universities excavating archeological sites. For
example, in 1906, the first federal legislation intended to preserve and protect Native
American archeological sites created a permitting system for the excavation of such sites,
which favored institutions such as museums and universities over individuals. See Green,
supra note 160, at 54-57, 57 n.122; Elizabeth M. Koehler, Repatriation of Cultural Objects
of Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Law, 41 Int'l Law.
103, 112 (2007); Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition
Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional
Knowledge in the United States, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 629, 636 n.33 (2007).
244. Stephen W. Clark, Cultural Property Update, in ALI-ABA Course of Study, Legal
Problems of Museum Administration 125, 141 (2003).
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antiquities to other museums.245 Such loans grant the right to possession to
the acquiring museum while the lending institution retains the future
interest-the right to possession when the loan ends. 246  Such loans
typically are for a number of months or years (a term of years). 247 With
respect to newly discovered antiquities, source countries could condition
the transferable term of years on the same basic terms as the current
practice of loaning antiquities to museums in consuming countries.
Moreover, source countries could condition the award of the transferable
term of years to the finder on the finder reporting the discovery in a timely
manner. 248  Such antiquities could then be registered, creating an
unambiguous chain of ti~tle. 249 Finders who fail to report their finds in a
timely manner would have no rights in the antiquity, thereby posing no risk
to the current efforts of source countries to recover illegally exported
antiquities.
In addition, the term of years approach is similar to the de facto outcome
when a source country successfully recovers an antiquity which was
illegally exported and/or sold to a museum or collector. For example, in
2006, the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) pledged to return to Italy
the Euphronios krater, a 2500-year-old vase that it had purchased in 1972
for approximately $1 million. 250 The de facto result is that the Met had a
term of years interest in the vase for thirty-four years. 251 The problem is
that under the current regime, the bulk of the money the Met paid for that
term of years went to the middlemen in the black market, not to the
245. See Clark, supra note 244, at 141; Palmer, supra note 47, at 950. Interestingly, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Ministry of Culture entered into an agreement whereby
the Met will return the Euphronios krater to Italy and, in exchange, Italy will be making
long-term loans of works of equal value to the Met. See Briggs, supra note 221, at 623.
246. See generally Palmer, supra note 47.
247. See generally Briggs, supra note 221, at 623; Palmer, supra note 47.
248. Such a reporting requirement is already in place in some source countries, either as a
requirement to receive the state sanctioned finder's fee or to avoid criminal sanctions. See
Doyal, supra note 209, at 677 (stating that the finder's fee system in Italy requires finders to
turn the antiquity over immediately to receive the compensation); Gerstenblith, supra note
53, at 240 n.190 (discussing England's Treasure Act of 1996 which imposes penalties on
finders who fail to report found treasure trove). Timely reporting requirements date back to
1624 when the Catholic Church required landowners to report finds within twenty-four hours
of discovery. See Brian Bengs, Dead on Arrival? A Comparison of the Unidroit Convention
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and U.S. Property Law, 6 Transnat'l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 503, 512 (1996).
249. See Willis, supra note 51, at 238; Gertrude M. Prescott, Book Review, 46 Brit. J.
Criminol. 357, 358 (2006) (reviewing S.M. MacKenzie, Going, Going, Gone: Regulating
the Market in Illicit Antiquities (2005)).
250. See Ashton Hawkins, The Euphronios Krater at the Metropolitan Museum: A
Question of Provenance, 27 Hastings L.J. 1163 (1976); Nicholas Gage, Met Finds Vase
Purchase "Legal, " N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1974, at 50. See generally Briggs, supra note 221.
251. The Met technically did not have a term of years because the last day of the term
was not calculable from the first day. See supra note 229. Looking at it ex post, however,
the de facto effect of the possession is similar to a term of years.
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finder.252 In addition, there is no doubt that substantial administrative costs
were expended both by the Met and the Italian authorities during the
recovery process. Instead of expending resources at the back end on
administrative costs, these funds would be better spent on the front end,
compensating the finder for his or her term of years. The ex post effect is
that the antiquity was basically "loaned" to the Met for the term in question.
If the Met had known that it was not acquiring a fee simple absolute, but
only a term of years, there is no doubt that it would not have paid a million
dollars. But even if one substantially discounts how much the Met would
have paid for the term of years, the amount would still be much more than
the original finder received when he or she sold it to the first middleman. 253
Creating a legal market in which finders can transfer a term of years
interest in newly discovered antiquities would maximize social welfare: (1)
it would create a financial incentive for finders to come forward with their
finds; (2) it would create an incentive for finders to leave the antiquity in
the ground to permit excavation by archeologists; and (3) it would create an
incentive for museums in consuming countries to fund such excavations,
thereby maximizing protection of both the tangible and the intangible
characteristics of the antiquity at minimal cost to the source countries.
G. Costs ofAdministration
Under the possessory estate and future interest approach to awarding
property rights to newly discovered antiquities, the financial incentive for
finders to come forward with their archeological artifacts would be
provided at minimal expense to source countries. By awarding the finder a
transferable term of years, source countries would be ensured ultimate
ownership and possession of the antiquity at minimal out-of-pocket
expense. The financial incentive would be provided by the market, i.e., by
those interested in purchasing the terms of years. As long as the duration of
the term of years is reasonable, there would be a vibrant market.
Moreover, the market for the transferable term of years should be
controlled by the source country. The source country could hold periodic
sales of all newly discovered antiquities found within the country. Finders
would be required to register their finds with the proper authorities to
252. See Borke, supra note 203, at 394-95; Briggs, supra note 221, at 637 n.79 ("It is
estimated that 98 percent of the profit from looted antiquities goes to the middlemen.");
Campagna, supra note 131, at 286 ("As sad as all this is, it is more painful still to know that
a poor Iraqi peasant who digs up a few cuneiform tablets, just to 'try to add to his meager
income, is exploited twice: [h]is own culture and history are destroyed, and he gets paid
only peanuts by the middlemen."' (quoting Francis Deblauwe, Melee at the Museum, Nat'l
Catholic Rep., Oct. 17, 2003,
http://www.natcath.com/NCROnline/archives2/2003d/101730/101703n.htm)).
253. See supra note 252. As long as the term of years is long enough, the finder's
compensation should also be greater than he or she would have received under any finder's
fee approach currently in place in any source country. See supra notes 209-12 and
accompanying text.
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qualify for the sale.2 54  In contrast to the high administrative costs
associated with the current enforcement efforts under the state ownership/
retention approach, 255 the possessory estate and future interest approach
would minimize administrative expenses by giving an incentive for finders
to report their finds to the proper authorities. In addition, by conducting the
sales, the authorities could ensure that only qualified prospective purchasers
participated, including museums and reputable dealers and collectors.256
By conducting the sales, the source countries would also have a paper trail
of the antiquity's transfer.257 Lastly, such sales could also generate revenue
for the source countries by way of sales and transfer taxes. These revenues
could be used to pay not only for the administrative costs of the transfer
system, but also to compensate any property owners whose land or
development rights may be taken due to its archeological significance. 258
H. Market Country Perspective
The possessory estate and future interest approach would go a long way
toward satisfying the interests of an important market player in consuming
countries: museums. Museums in market countries have, as part of their
mission, the desire to house, study, and exhibit newly discovered
antiquities. 259 While they would prefer ownership, 260 the ability to house
and study such antiquities for an extended period of time, which a
reasonable term of years would grant them, should be adequate. Museums
and reputable dealers and collectors would much prefer the certainty that a
sanctioned market in newly discovered antiquities would offer26 1 to the
254. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
255. Source countries which have adopted the state ownership/retention approach
typically also have antiquities police to ensure enforcement. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at
1038. Moreover,
[b]ecause there is no legal trade in the antiquities, all exportation and trade will be
relegated to the illegal market, creating an even larger black market system that is
much more difficult to police and prevent. However, [t]he attempt to embargo the
flow of art to other countries suffers from another vice: The broader and more
inclusive the embargo, the more difficult it is, physically and economically and
politically, to enforce effectively.
Willis, supra note 51, at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. See Osman, supra note 124, at 996-97 for a discussion of a managed market
likewise limited in participants. Participants could be required to post a bond or letter of
credit to ensure return of the antiquity when the term of years had expired.
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
258. For evidence of the need to compensate such property owners, see Cohan, supra
note 69, at 56; Borodkin, supra note 49, at 406; Chang, supra note 42, at 835-36.
259. See Briggs, supra note 221, at 627; Cohan, supra note 69, at 57.
260. See Briggs, supra note 221, at 627-28. See generally Knox, supra note 58
(discussing the Bizot Group's Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal
Museums).
261. It is well recognized that if an international market for legitimate antiquities were to
emerge, the certainty associated with such transactions would ensure a vibrant and profitable
market. Museums and reputable dealers and collectors would much prefer the certainty
associated with a legitimate market over the current uncertainty. See Borodkin, supra note
49, at 412-13; Petr, supra note 49, at 504.
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uncertainties of the current regime where an antiquity's provenance is often
ambiguous at best. Under the current regime, museums and collectors run
the risk of not only losing their investment if the antiquity turns out to have
been illegally exported, but they also suffer stiff penalties and the public
embarrassment of being involved in an illegal conveyance. 262 Museums
and reputable collectors would welcome the opportunity to purchase a legal
property interest in newly discovered antiquities, even if only for a limited
period of time.263
I. Source Country Perspective
The drawback to the possessory estate and future interest approach to
newly discovered antiquities is that the source country must relinquish
possession of the antiquity for the term of years. 264 The loss of this cultural
property, even for a limited period of time, no doubt is a cost to the source
country. But this loss must be compared to the costs currently imposed on
source countries under the prevailing state ownership/retention approach.
Although there is no way to know for sure, it is widely acknowledged that
most finders of newly discovered antiquities turn to the black market. 26 5
Source countries lose possession of these antiquities, and there is little
chance that they will ever regain possession of them. 266 In addition, even if
such illegally exported antiquities are recovered, often the artifact has
sustained artistic damage, 267 and much, if not all, of the historical and
archeological information which was inherent in the find is lost forever.268
As the Getty and Met Agreements demonstrate, even where recovery efforts
are successful, the source country often will have been deprived of
possession of the antiquity for years, if not decades. 269 Why not voluntarily
agree to give up that possession in exchange for the benefits of the certainty
of return at a fixed point in the near future coupled with the added value of
enhanced artistic, historical, and archeological benefits?
262. See Briggs, supra note 221, at 627-28; Pearlstein, supra note 195, at 138-39;
Warring, supra note 170, at 297; Petr, supra note 49, at 513-17.
263. The time-honored practice of countries loaning out collections to museums in
exchange for valuable consideration shows that at least museums would be interested in
purchasing a term of years. From the museums' perspective, there is not much difference
between the two arrangements--only to whom the payment is being made. See generally
Palmer, supra note 47.
264. Of course, a source country could purchase the term of years of the antiquities it
deemed too important to let leave the country.
265. See Moore, supra note 52, at 468-69; see also Robin Morris Collin, The Law and
Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 How. L.J. 17, 17 (1993); McElroy, supra note 211,
at 549.
266. Dutra, supra note 61, at 75; Margules, supra note 171, at 611; Willis, supra note 51,
at 224.
267. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text; see also Park, supra note 137, at
933.
269. See Povoledo, supra note 1; see also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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J. The Problem of "Looted" Antiquities
While a possessory estate and future interest approach to the allocation of
property would go a long way toward creating an incentive for otherwise
law-abiding finders who unexpectedly, and often accidentally, stumble
upon a newly discovered antiquity to report the find to the proper state
authorities, there is also the problem of looted antiquities being sold on the
international black market. 270 As used here, looted antiquities are those
intentionally and illegally taken from known and reported archeological
sites and/or antiquities found by professional thieves who trespass on
private and/or government property in the hope of finding, excavating, and
exporting antiquities. These finders are much more intent upon breaking
the law. It is unclear how much of the black market consists of the sale of
"accidentally found" newly discovered antiquities and how much of the
black market consists of "looted" antiquities, but many claim that the bulk
of the transactions involve looted antiquities.271 It might appear that the
possessory estate and future interest approach to who owns a newly
discovered antiquity would have no impact on the problem of looted
antiquities, but the opposite is true: The adoption of the possessory estate
and future interest approach would have a meaningful and positive effect on
reducing the black market for looted antiquities.
1. Enlisting Private Landowners
First, many "looted" antiquities are newly discovered antiquities that are
found by "tombaroli" 272 or grave robbers-professional thieves who
trespass onto others' lands in search of undiscovered antiquities. 273 The
practice of looting is more widespread than it should be because under the
prevailing state ownership/retention approach, undiscovered antiquities
suffer from the "tragedy of the commons." 274 Private landowners have no
real incentive to protect against tombaroli coming onto their property in
search of antiquities because they have no meaningful legal interest in such
items. In fact, such tombaroli might actually be doing the landowner a
favor if the discovery of the antiquity would cause the state to take not only
the antiquity but the real property where it was found because of its
archeological significance. 275 If, on the other hand, landowners were
granted a term of years in any and all antiquities on their land, under the
270. See Bator, supra note 55, at 290-92; Cohan, supra note 69, at 10-11; Christa L.
Kirby, Stolen Cultural Property: Available Museum Responses to an International
Dilemma, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 729, 732 (2000).
271. See Borodkin, supra note 49, at 407. See generally Szopa, supra note 62.
272. Looters of newly discovered antiquities are called tombaroli in Italy. See Bator,
supra note 55, at 292; see also Briggs, supra note 221, at 637; Park, supra note 137, at 931-
32.
273. See Bator, supra note 55, at 292; McElroy, supra note 211, at 555; Chang, supra
note 42, at 835 n.39.
274. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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traditional law of finders approach, their property rights would prevail over
a trespassing finder.276 If the landowners were granted an interest in any
newly discovered antiquities on their land, they would be much more
diligent in protecting their property from the tombaroli. All landowners
would immediately, and costlessly, be enlisted in the national project of
protecting the country's archeological artifacts. More antiquities would be
found by otherwise law-abiding individuals who would now have an
incentive to come forward with their finds as compared to the current
regime where the landowners may even be thankful that the tombaroli have
secreted the antiquities off their land. A possessory estate and future
interest approach would reduce the prevalence of looted antiquities, 277
thereby reducing the supply for the black market and increasing the supply
for the source country sanctioned sales.
2. Enhancing Enforcement Efforts
A possessory estate and future interest approach to newly discovered
antiquities would also enhance source country enforcement efforts. Under
the prevailing state ownership/retention approach, source country
enforcement efforts are spread thin because they have to try to uncover the
illegal exporting of newly discovered antiquities as well as looting from
known archeological sites.2 78 Under a possessory estate and future interest
approach, local landowners would have an interest in protecting their lands
from thieves who trespass onto their lands in search of undiscovered
antiquities. By enlisting the aid of local landowners with respect to newly
discovered antiquities, source countries could focus their enforcement
efforts on known archeological sites.
In addition, if source countries were to partner with Western museums
that fund the archeological excavation of the site, the museums would have
an incentive to fund increased security measures at the site. The museums
would have a vested interest in protecting their investment. This would also
free up the source countries' enforcement resources at that site so that they
could be transferred to other sites that lacked international funding.
Better focused efforts should be more productive in deterring those who
might be tempted to loot antiquities and in catching those who do loot
276. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 1051; see also Moorman, supra note 156, at 720
n.27; Sharma, supra note 142, at 753-54. Where the trespass is trivial or technical, the
trespasser may prevail in his or her claim. See Edward P. Morton, Public Policy and the
Finders Cases, 1 Wyo. L.J. 101, 105 (1947).
277. This assumes that the source countries use some of the revenues generated by the
auction of the term of years to compensate property owners for any lands taken because of
their archeological significance. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the
incentive provided by the term of years may not offset the potential loss if property owners'
land can still be taken without compensation.
278. See Bator, supra note 55, at 302; Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in
Cultural Property: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the
Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 469, 486 n.84 (1995);
Moore, supra note 52, at 469-70.
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antiquities. A possessory estate and future interest approach would increase
protection for newly discovered antiquities by making enforcement efforts
more effective.
3. Reducing Demand in Market Countries
A possessory estate and future interest approach would also help reduce
the international black market for looted antiquities by reducing demand in
the market countries. Many commentators have argued that the driving
force behind the problem of looted antiquities is the excessive demand and
minimal supply of antiquities. 279 Under such conditions, prices soar,
thereby increasing the 'incentive for finders and smugglers of newly
discovered antiquities to take the risks inherent in turning to the black
market.280  If, however, a legitimate market for newly discovered
antiquities were established, museums and other reputable dealers and
collectors would prefer the certainty of the legitimate market over the
uncertainty of the black market. 281 This is particularly true with respect to
the more valuable antiquities. As the demand for black market antiquities
drops, particularly the more valuable ones, so too will prices, thereby
reducing the incentive for finders to turn to the black market. The black
market for looted antiquities could be reduced to an illicit trade of less
valuable antiquities.
CONCLUSION
Social welfare with respect to newly discovered antiquities, whether
measured nationally or internationally, is maximized by maximizing
protection of the antiquities. Maximizing protection includes not only
protecting the tangible component of the antiquity, but also its intangible
archeological, historical, and/or cultural components. Museums and source
countries should be working together to maximize the protection of newly
discovered antiquities, but the "all or nothing" fee simple absolute approach
to awarding property rights in newly discovered antiquities has driven a
wedge between them. The traditional law of finders, which awards a freely
transferable fee simple to the finder, typically results in the newly
discovered antiquity ending up in a consuming country museum to the
chagrin of the source country. In theory, the prevailing source country state
ownership/retention approach awards title to the source country, which will
result in the newly discovered antiquities remaining in the source country to
the chagrin of the museums in consuming countries. In practice, the effect
of the prevailing source country state ownership/retention approach has
resulted in many, if not most, newly discovered antiquities being sold to
279. See Jowers, supra note 243, at 147-48; Merryman, supra note 58, at 831-33; Szopa,
supra note 62, at 75-76 (acknowledging that while the supply has increased due to black
market transfers, relative to the demand the supply is still minimal).
280. See Bator, supra note 55, at 291 n.41; Borke, supra note 203, at 394-95.
281. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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private collectors on the black market to the chagrin of both the source
countries and the consuming country museums.
Consuming country museums and source countries need to work together
if protection for newly discovered antiquities is to be maximized. While the
Getty Agreement and other agreements like it will result in Western
museums acquiring far fewer antiquities with questionable provenances,
such agreements will not stop the thriving black market in illegally exported
antiquities. Instead, these agreements will shift the demand side to
unscrupulous buyers, thereby reducing the chances that newly discovered
antiquities sold on the black market will ever be seen and appreciated by the
public. To maximize social welfare, source countries and consuming
museums need. to work together, to protect newly discovered antiquities by
thinking outside of the traditional "fee simple" box.
To maximize protection of newly discovered antiquities, finders should
be granted a possessory estate-a term of years-with the future interest
being granted to the source country. The term of years should be freely
transferable as long as the finder registers the find with the source country
and transfers the antiquity in a source country sanctioned sale. Purchasers
can be limited to museums and other reputable collectors in revenue-rich
but antiquities-poor consuming countries that are interested in acquiring
such antiquities, albeit for a relatively limited period of time.
The result would be a "win-win" for all interested parties. Finders of
newly discovered antiquities "win" because they would have a financial
incentive to come forward with their find-the right to sell their possessory
estate, a valuable property interest. More importantly, the incentive would
be created at almost no cost to the source countries. The cost would be
placed primarily on prominent museums in consuming countries. Such
museums are in the best position to bear and distribute such costs.
Museums around the world "win" because they would acquire the right to
temporarily house, study, and show newly discovered antiquities, thereby
furthering their mission and providing the consuming country's public with
an opportunity to see such antiquities. Source countries "win" because they
would receive ultimate ownership of all antiquities found within their
borders, which is their socially desirable goal, albeit delayed, at minimal
administrative costs. From both a theoretical and a practical perspective,
the best approach to who owns a newly discovered antiquity is a possessory
estate and future interest approach.
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